コンテンツにスキップ

利用者:織田蔦仁/sandbox

摩擦圧接（まさつあっせつ、英語: friction welding）とは、2個以上の部材の接合部を圧接触させながら一方の部材を回転や摺動する事による摩擦熱で、接合部を一体化する接合方法。通常は容易に行える回転による摩擦を使用する方法が一般的。圧接に適した温度にコントロールする事が必要。接合部の強度が高いことが特徴。 摩擦溶接（FRW）は、部材同士を機械的に摩擦することにより熱を発生させ、「アプセット」と呼ばれる横方向の力を加えて材料を塑性的に変形させて融着させる溶接法である。溶解が起こらないため、従来のような融着溶接ではなく、鍛接に近い技術である。摩擦圧接は、金属や熱可塑性樹脂を用いて、航空・自動車など幅広い用途で使用されている。

長所 高速接合時間と溶接界面での直接入熱の組み合わせにより、熱影響部が比較的小さくなる。摩擦圧接では一般的に溶融しないため、高強度熱処理鋼などの設計材料の粒成長を軽減する。もう1つの利点は、運動が溶接される材料の間の表面をきれいにする傾向があることで、少ない準備で接合できるということである。溶接プロセスでは、使用する方法にもよりますが、プラスチックや金属の小さな破片が作業塊から押し出されます（フラッシュ）。フラッシュが破片や汚れを運び去ると考えられている

関連項目[編集]

スタブアイコンサブスタブ

この項目は、まだ閲覧者の調べものの参照としては役立たない、工学・技術に関連した書きかけの項目です。この項目を加筆・訂正などしてくださる協力者を求めています。



株式会社でほぎゃらりー
Dehogallery, Inc.
種類 株式会社
本社所在地 181-0013
東京都三鷹市下連雀3丁目27番13号
設立 2015年7月1日
業種 情報・通信業
法人番号 1012401030276
事業内容

アニメーション及びゲームの背景制作とアートディレクション

広告・出版物・展示物の背景美術・イラストの制作
代表者 代表取締役社長 太田豊紀
テンプレートを表示

株式会社でほぎゃらりー(英: Dehogallery, Inc.)とは、アニメーション等の背景美術を制作する日本の企業である。

概要[編集]

2014年末、スタジオジブリの劇場長編アニメーション作品である思い出のマーニーの後にスタジオジブリの制作部門が解散され、退社した西村義明と米林宏昌が2015年4月にスタジオポノックを設立した。その後、スタジオポノック、スタジオカラー、ドワンゴの三社が協力し、スタジオジブリで長年美術監督を務めてきた男鹿和雄を中心とし、同じくスタジオジブリを退社した美術スタッフ等とともに、アニメーションの背景美術制作スタジオとして2015年7月に設立した。
なお2018年現在スタジオジブリの制作部門は再編され、新たな劇場長編アニメーションを製作中である。

由来[編集]

社名の「でほぎゃらりー」
手描きのアニメーション背景美術

参加作品[編集]

外部リンク[編集]

参考文献[編集]

認知バイアスの一覧

認知バイアスとは、合理的な判断や標準的な思考から逸脱してしまう体系的な傾向であり、主に心理学や行動経済学の分野において研究されている。 しかし実際、これらのバイアスは複数の研究によって再現性が確認されているが、それらをどのように分類するか、またどのように説明するかについては論争が絶えない。一部の認知バイアスは、ヒューリスティクスと呼ばれる、脳が意思決定や判断を行うための情報処理の仕組み(すなわち、知的ショートカット)によってもたらされる。バイアスは様々な形態があり、Mental noiseといった「冷たい(客観的な？)」認知バイアスや、希望的観測によって歪曲させられた思い込みなどの「熱い(積極的な)」動機のバイアスが存在する。どちらのバイアスの影響も同時に発現し得る。

またこれらの一部のバイアスについては、無益だったり不合理だったりするものであるとみなすか、あるいは有益な態度や行動であるとみなすかについては論争がある。例えば、他者のことを知るために、人は自らの先入観を確認するように偏った誘導的な質問をする傾向がある。この種の確証バイアスはまた社会技能の一例であると主張されている。それは相手とのつながりを確立する手段である。

こうした研究は圧倒的に多くが人間に関するものだが、人間以外の動物でもバイアスの存在を示す所見が見出されている。例えば、双曲割引はラット、ハト、サルで観察されている。

意思決定、思い込み、行動に関するバイアス[編集]

これらのバイアスの多くは、思い込みの形成、ビジネスと経済における決定、そして一般的な人間の行動に影響を及ぼす。

名前 英語名 説明
曖昧性効果　曖昧効果？ Ambiguity effect 情報が不足していてよくわからないと思える選択肢は避ける傾向。（曖昧さ回避 (経済学)（ambiguity aversion）も参照のこと）The tendency to avoid options for which missing information makes the probability seem "unknown".[1]
アンカリング or focalism(フォーカリズム、焦点化傾向) Anchoring or focalism The tendency to rely too heavily, or "anchor", on one trait or piece of information when making decisions (usually the first piece of information acquired on that subject).[2][3]
人間中心主義 Anthropocentric thinking The tendency to use human analogies as a basis for reasoning about other, less familiar, biological phenomena.[4]
擬人観？ or personification Anthropomorphism or personification The tendency to characterize animals, objects, and abstract concepts as possessing human-like traits, emotions, and intentions.[5]
Attentional bias The tendency of perception to be affected by recurring thoughts.[6]
Automation bias The tendency to depend excessively on automated systems which can lead to erroneous automated information overriding correct decisions.[7]
可用性ヒューリスティックまたは利用可能性ヒューリスティック Availability heuristic The tendency to overestimate the likelihood of events with greater "availability" in memory, which can be influenced by how recent the memories are or how unusual or emotionally charged they may be.[8]
Availability cascade 可用性カスケード？ A self-reinforcing process in which a collective belief gains more and more plausibility through its increasing repetition in public discourse (or "repeat something long enough and it will become true").[9]
Backfire effect The reaction to disconfirming evidence by strengthening one's previous beliefs.[10] cf. Continued influence effect.
バンドワゴン効果 Bandwagon effect The tendency to do (or believe) things because many other people do (or believe) the same. Related to groupthink and herd behavior.[11]
Base rate fallacy or Base rate neglect The tendency to ignore base rate information (generic, general information) and focus on specific information (information only pertaining to a certain case).[12]
信念バイアス Belief bias ある主張の結論の信じやすさが、その主張がどの程度論理的かという評価を左右する効果。An effect where someone's evaluation of the logical strength of an argument is biased by the believability of the conclusion.[13]
Ben Franklin effect A person who has performed a favor for someone is more likely to do another favor for that person than they would be if they had received a favor from that person.
Berkson's paradox The tendency to misinterpret statistical experiments involving conditional probabilities.
バイアスの盲点 Bias blind spot 自分は他人よりバイアスが少ないと考え、他人には自分と比べ多くのバイアスが見受けられると考える傾向。The tendency to see oneself as less biased than other people, or to be able to identify more cognitive biases in others than in oneself.[14]
傍観者効果 Bystander effect The tendency to think that others will act in an emergency situation.
Choice-supportive bias The tendency to remember one's choices as better than they actually were.[15]
クラスター錯覚 Clustering illusion The tendency to overestimate the importance of small runs, streaks, or clusters in large samples of random data (that is, seeing phantom patterns).[3]
確証バイアス Confirmation bias The tendency to search for, interpret, focus on and remember information in a way that confirms one's preconceptions.[16]
合同偏向 Congruence bias ある仮説を直接実験で検証する一方で、それに反する仮説を検証しない傾向。The tendency to test hypotheses exclusively through direct testing, instead of testing possible alternative hypotheses.[3]
合接の誤謬 Conjunction fallacy The tendency to assume that specific conditions are more probable than general ones.[17]
Conservatism (belief revision) The tendency to revise one's belief insufficiently when presented with new evidence.[18][19][20]
Continued influence effect The tendency to believe previously learned misinformation even after it has been corrected. Misinformation can still influence inferences one generates after a correction has occurred.[21] cf. Backfire effect
コントラスト効果 Contrast effect The enhancement or reduction of a certain stimulus' perception when compared with a recently observed, contrasting object.[22]
Courtesy bias The tendency to give an opinion that is more socially correct than one's true opinion, so as to avoid offending anyone.[23]
Curse of knowledge When better-informed people find it extremely difficult to think about problems from the perspective of lesser-informed people.[24]
Declinism The predisposition to view the past favourably (rosy retrospection) and future negatively.[25]
おとり効果 Decoy effect 選択肢AとBが存在するところに、すべての点でBに劣るがAには一部のみ劣る選択肢Cが提示された時、選択肢Bの評価を優遇するようになること。Preferences for either option A or B change in favor of option B when option C is presented, which is completely dominated by option B (inferior in all respects) and partially dominated by option A.
Default effect When given a choice between several options, the tendency to favor the default one.
Denomination effect The tendency to spend more money when it is denominated in small amounts (e.g., coins) rather than large amounts (e.g., bills).[26]
Disposition effect The tendency to sell an asset that has accumulated in value and resist selling an asset that has declined in value.
Distinction bias The tendency to view two options as more dissimilar when evaluating them simultaneously than when evaluating them separately.[27]
ダニング＝クルーガー効果 Dunning–Kruger effect The tendency for unskilled individuals to overestimate their own ability and the tendency for experts to underestimate their own ability.[28]
Duration neglect The neglect of the duration of an episode in determining its value
感情移入ギャップ Empathy gap The tendency to underestimate the influence or strength of feelings, in either oneself or others.
Endowment effect The tendency for people to demand much more to give up an object than they would be willing to pay to acquire it.[29]
Exaggerated expectation Based on the estimates,[要説明] real-world evidence turns out to be less extreme than our expectations (conditionally inverse of the conservatism bias).Template:Unreliable-source-inline[18][30]
Experimenter's or expectation bias実験者効果？実験者バイアス 実験者は、自らの実験結果の予想に一致するデータのみを信じ、証明し、公表する一方で、予想に反する他のデータの重要性は信じず、無視し、評価を下げる傾向。The tendency for experimenters to believe, certify, and publish data that agree with their expectations for the outcome of an experiment, and to disbelieve, discard, or downgrade the corresponding weightings for data that appear to conflict with those expectations.[31]
Focusing effect The tendency to place too much importance on one aspect of an event.[32]
Forer effect or バーナム効果 Forer effect or Barnum effect 個々人が、自分自身のために用意された、自分の性格を非常に正確に説明していると思う記述が、実際には曖昧で多くの人々に当てはまるような一般的な記述であること。この効果は、占星術、占い、筆跡占い、その他様々な性格診断など、一部の思い込みや慣行が広範で受け入れられていることを部分的に説明することができる。（日本では、血液型占いによる個人の性格の判定に思わず納得してしまう現象がある。）The observation that individuals will give high accuracy ratings to descriptions of their personality that supposedly are tailored specifically for them, but are in fact vague and general enough to apply to a wide range of people. This effect can provide a partial explanation for the widespread acceptance of some beliefs and practices, such as astrology, fortune telling, graphology, and some types of personality tests.
Form function attribution bias The tendency of people to make systematic errors when interacting with a robot found in human–robot interaction. It is argued that people base their expectations and perceptions of a robot on its appearance (form) and attribute functions which do not necessarily mirror the true functions of the robot.[33]
Framing effect Drawing different conclusions from the same information, depending on how that information is presented
Frequency illusion The illusion in which a word, a name, or other thing that has recently come to one's attention suddenly seems to appear with improbable frequency shortly afterwards (not to be confused with the recency illusion or selection bias).[34] This illusion is sometimes referred to as the Baader-Meinhof phenomenon.[35]
Functional fixedness Limits a person to using an object only in the way it is traditionally used.
Gambler's fallacy The tendency to think that future probabilities are altered by past events, when in reality they are unchanged. The fallacy arises from an erroneous conceptualization of the law of large numbers. For example, "I've flipped heads with this coin five times consecutively, so the chance of tails coming out on the sixth flip is much greater than heads."
Hard–easy effect Based on a specific level of task difficulty, the confidence in judgments is too conservative and not extreme enough[18][36][37][38]
後知恵バイアス Hindsight bias Sometimes called the "I-knew-it-all-along" effect, the tendency to see past events as being predictable[39] at the time those events happened.
Hostile attribution bias The "hostile attribution bias" is the tendency to interpret others' behaviors as having hostile intent, even when the behavior is ambiguous or benign.
ホットハンドの誤謬 Hot-hand fallacy （賭け事など）無作為に決定されることで成功を経験した人は、更に挑戦しても成功し続けられるだろうと思い込むこと。The "hot-hand fallacy" (also known as the "hot hand phenomenon" or "hot hand") is the fallacious belief that a person who has experienced success with a random event has a greater chance of further success in additional attempts.
双曲割引 Hyperbolic discounting Discounting is the tendency for people to have a stronger preference for more immediate payoffs relative to later payoffs. Hyperbolic discounting leads to choices that are inconsistent over time – people make choices today that their future selves would prefer not to have made, despite using the same reasoning.[40] Also known as current moment bias, present-bias, and related to Dynamic inconsistency. A good example of this: a study showed that when making food choices for the coming week, 74% of participants chose fruit, whereas when the food choice was for the current day, 70% chose chocolate.
Identifiable victim effect The tendency to respond more strongly to a single identified person at risk than to a large group of people at risk.[41]
イケア効果 IKEA effect イケアの家具のように、出来栄えはどうあれ自分が少しでも手をかけて作ったものには異常なほど高い評価をする傾向。（→https://www.idia.jp/report/ikea-effect/　も参照）The tendency for people to place a disproportionately high value on objects that they partially assembled themselves, such as furniture from IKEA, regardless of the quality of the end result.[要出典]
Illicit transference Occurs when a term in the distributive (referring to every member of a class) and collective (referring to the class itself as a whole) sense are treated as equivalent. The two variants of this fallacy are the fallacy of composition and the fallacy of division.
コントロール幻想 Illusion of control The tendency to overestimate one's degree of influence over other external events.[42]
妥当性の錯覚 Illusion of validity 特に手に入る情報が考えに合致したり相互に関係するものである時、自分の判断が正確だと思いこむこと。Belief that our judgments are accurate, especially when available information is consistent or inter-correlated.[43]
錯誤相関 Illusory correlation 相関のない２つの事柄に相関があると誤って認識すること。Inaccurately perceiving a relationship between two unrelated events.[44][45]
真理の錯誤効果 Illusory truth effect 真実性にかかわらず、より簡単に説明のつく、または何度も繰り返される主張の方を真実だと思いこむ傾向。A tendency to believe that a statement is true if it is easier to process, or if it has been stated multiple times, regardless of its actual veracity. 希望的観測の一例でもある。These are specific cases of truthiness.
インパクトバイアス Impact bias 将来想定される事柄のインパクトは長期的で過激であると過大評価する傾向。The tendency to overestimate the length or the intensity of the impact of future feeling states.[46]
Information bias The tendency to seek information even when it cannot affect action.[47]
サンプルサイズに対する鈍感さ標本の大きさの無視、母集団バイアス。 Insensitivity to sample size 少ないサンプルの変動を過小評価する傾向。The tendency to under-expect variation in small samples.
Irrational escalation The phenomenon where people justify increased investment in a decision, based on the cumulative prior investment, despite new evidence suggesting that the decision was probably wrong. Also known as the sunk cost fallacy.
Law of the instrument An over-reliance on a familiar tool or methods, ignoring or under-valuing alternative approaches. "If all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail."
Less-is-better effect The tendency to prefer a smaller set to a larger set judged separately, but not jointly.
どこでも効果 Look-elsewhere effect An apparently statistically significant observation may have actually arisen by chance because of the size of the parameter space to be searched.
Loss aversion The disutility of giving up an object is greater than the utility associated with acquiring it.[48] (see also Sunk cost effects and endowment effect).
単純接触効果 Mere exposure effect The tendency to express undue liking for things merely because of familiarity with them.[49]
Money illusion The tendency to concentrate on the nominal value (face value) of money rather than its value in terms of purchasing power.[50]
Moral credential effect The tendency of a track record of non-prejudice to increase subsequent prejudice.
Negativity bias or Negativity effect Psychological phenomenon by which humans have a greater recall of unpleasant memories compared with positive memories.[51][52] (see also actor-observer bias, group attribution error, positivity effect, and negativity effect).[53]
確率の無視 Neglect of probability あることが起こるかどうか不確かな状況下で決定を下す時、それが起こる可能性を完全に無視する傾向。The tendency to completely disregard probability when making a decision under uncertainty.[54]
正常性バイアス Normalcy bias 今までに一度も起こっていない災害に備えたり、予期したりすることを拒絶すること。The refusal to plan for, or react to, a disaster which has never happened before.
Not invented here Aversion to contact with or use of products, research, standards, or knowledge developed outside a group. Related to IKEA effect.
観察者期待効果 Observer-expectancy effect When a researcher expects a given result and therefore unconsciously manipulates an experiment or misinterprets data in order to find it (see also subject-expectancy effect).
不作為バイアス Omission bias 有害な行為を行う方が、同じくらい有害な不作為よりもより悪い、非道徳的だと判断する傾向。（例えばスポーツの審判が、重大な局面で、誤審を恐れてあえて何も判断しないことを言う。）The tendency to judge harmful actions as worse, or less moral, than equally harmful omissions (inactions).[55]
Optimism bias The tendency to be over-optimistic, overestimating favorable and pleasing outcomes (see also wishful thinking, valence effect, positive outcome bias).[56][57]
Ostrich effect Ignoring an obvious (negative) situation.
Outcome bias The tendency to judge a decision by its eventual outcome instead of based on the quality of the decision at the time it was made.
Overconfidence effect Excessive confidence in one's own answers to questions. For example, for certain types of questions, answers that people rate as "99% certain" turn out to be wrong 40% of the time.[18][58][59][60]
パレイドリア Pareidolia A vague and random stimulus (often an image or sound) is perceived as significant, e.g., seeing images of animals or faces in clouds, the man in the moon, and hearing non-existent hidden messages on records played in reverse.
Pessimism bias The tendency for some people, especially those suffering from depression, to overestimate the likelihood of negative things happening to them.
プラシーボ効果 Placebo effect The belief that a medication works—even if merely a placebo.
Planning fallacy The tendency to underestimate task-completion times.[46]
Post-purchase rationalization The tendency to persuade oneself through rational argument that a purchase was good value.
Pro-innovation biasイノベーション推進バイアス、親イノベーションバイアス？ The tendency to have an excessive optimism towards an invention or innovation's usefulness throughout society, while often failing to identify its limitations and weaknesses.
Projection bias The tendency to overestimate how much our future selves share one's current preferences, thoughts and values, thus leading to sub-optimal choices.[61][62][52]
Pseudocertainty effect The tendency to make risk-averse choices if the expected outcome is positive, but make risk-seeking choices to avoid negative outcomes.[63]
心理的リアクタンス Reactance (psychology)　Reactance 他人に何かをすることを求められた時、このことが自分の行動の選択の自由を制限しようとしていると認識し、これに抵抗しようとする欲求から、求められたことに逆らう衝動。The urge to do the opposite of what someone wants you to do out of a need to resist a perceived attempt to constrain your freedom of choice (see also Reverse psychology).
Reactive devaluation Devaluing proposals only because they purportedly originated with an adversary.
Recency illusion The illusion that a word or language usage is a recent innovation when it is in fact long-established (see also frequency illusion).
Regressive bias A certain state of mind wherein high values and high likelihoods are overestimated while low values and low likelihoods are underestimated.[18][64][65]Template:Unreliable-source-inline
Restraint bias The tendency to overestimate one's ability to show restraint in the face of temptation.
韻踏み効果 Rhyme as reason effect 韻を踏んだ表現はより説得力を持つこと。Rhyming statements are perceived as more truthful. A famous example being used in the O.J Simpson trial with the defense's use of the phrase "If the gloves don't fit, then you must acquit."
Risk compensation / Peltzman effect The tendency to take greater risks when perceived safety increases.
観測選択効果? Selection bias The tendency to notice something more when something causes us to be more aware of it, such as when we buy a car, we tend to notice similar cars more often than we did before. They are not suddenly more common - we just are noticing them more. Also called the Observational Selection Bias.
選択的知覚 Selective perception 予期することがその後の知覚に影響する傾向。The tendency for expectations to affect perception.
センメルヴェイス反射 Semmelweis reflex 既存の理論的枠組みを否定する新しい根拠を拒絶する傾向。（センメルヴェイス・イグナーツが、医師から患者への接触感染を指摘したが、学会にその説を拒絶されたことに由来する。）The tendency to reject new evidence that contradicts a paradigm.[20]
Sexual overperception bias / sexual underperception bias The tendency to over-/underestimate sexual interest of another person in oneself.
Social comparison bias The tendency, when making decisions, to favour potential candidates who don't compete with one's own particular strengths.[66]
Social desirability bias The tendency to over-report socially desirable characteristics or behaviours in oneself and under-report socially undesirable characteristics or behaviours.[67]
Status quo bias The tendency to like things to stay relatively the same (see also loss aversion, endowment effect, and system justification).[68][69]
ステレオタイプ Stereotyping Expecting a member of a group to have certain characteristics without having actual information about that individual.
Subadditivity effect The tendency to judge probability of the whole to be less than the probabilities of the parts.[70]
主観的承認 Subjective validation 主観が、あることが真実であることを望む時、それが真実であると認識すること。Perception that something is true if a subject's belief demands it to be true. また、偶然一致した対象間に思い込んだ関係性を割り当てること。Also assigns perceived connections between coincidences.
Surrogation Losing sight of the strategic construct that a measure is intended to represent, and subsequently acting as though the measure is the construct of interest.
生存バイアス生存者バイアス Survivorship bias 時が経過して（生き）残った人々や事物にのみ注意を注ぎ、現在は見ることのできない過去の人々や事物を不注意にも見落とすこと。Concentrating on the people or things that "survived" some process and inadvertently overlooking those that didn't because of their lack of visibility.
Time-saving bias Underestimations of the time that could be saved (or lost) when increasing (or decreasing) from a relatively low speed and overestimations of the time that could be saved (or lost) when increasing (or decreasing) from a relatively high speed.
第三者効果 Third-person effect Belief that mass communicated media messages have a greater effect on others than on themselves.
パーキンソンの凡俗法則 Parkinson's law of triviality The tendency to give disproportionate weight to trivial issues. Also known as bikeshedding, this bias explains why an organization may avoid specialized or complex subjects, such as the design of a nuclear reactor, and instead focus on something easy to grasp or rewarding to the average participant, such as the design of an adjacent bike shed.[71]
Unit bias The tendency to want to finish a given unit of a task or an item. Strong effects on the consumption of food in particular.[72]
ヴェーバー‐フェヒナーの法則 Weber–Fechner law 量が多いとその中の小さな差を認識しづらくなること。Difficulty in comparing small differences in large quantities.
Well travelled road effect Underestimation of the duration taken to traverse oft-traveled routes and overestimation of the duration taken to traverse less familiar routes.
Women are wonderful effect A tendency to associate more positive attributes with women than with men.
Zero-risk bias Preference for reducing a small risk to zero over a greater reduction in a larger risk.
Zero-sum bias A bias whereby a situation is incorrectly perceived to be like a zero-sum game (i.e., one person gains at the expense of another).

Social biases[編集]

Most of these biases are labeled as 帰属バイアス

名前 英語名 説明
Actor-observer bias The tendency for explanations of other individuals' behaviors to overemphasize the influence of their personality and underemphasize the influence of their situation (see also Fundamental attribution error), and for explanations of one's own behaviors to do the opposite (that is, to overemphasize the influence of our situation and underemphasize the influence of our own personality).
Authority bias The tendency to attribute greater accuracy to the opinion of an authority figure (unrelated to its content) and be more influenced by that opinion.[73]
Cheerleader effect The tendency for people to appear more attractive in a group than in isolation.[74]
Defensive attribution hypothesis Attributing more blame to a harm-doer as the outcome becomes more severe or as personal or situational similarity to the victim increases.
Egocentric bias Occurs when people claim more responsibility for themselves for the results of a joint action than an outside observer would credit them with.
Extrinsic incentives bias An exception to the fundamental attribution error, when people view others as having (situational) extrinsic motivations and (dispositional) intrinsic motivations for oneself
偽の合意効果 False consensus effect The tendency for people to overestimate the degree to which others agree with them.[75]
Forer effect (aka Barnum effect) The tendency to give high accuracy ratings to descriptions of their personality that supposedly are tailored specifically for them, but are in fact vague and general enough to apply to a wide range of people. For example, horoscopes.
根本的な帰属の誤り Fundamental attribution error The tendency for people to over-emphasize personality-based explanations for behaviors observed in others while under-emphasizing the role and power of situational influences on the same behavior[52] (see also actor-observer bias, group attribution error, positivity effect, and negativity effect).[53]
集団の帰属の誤り Group attribution error The biased belief that the characteristics of an individual group member are reflective of the group as a whole or the tendency to assume that group decision outcomes reflect the preferences of group members, even when information is available that clearly suggests otherwise.
ハロー効果 Halo effect The tendency for a person's positive or negative traits to "spill over" from one personality area to another in others' perceptions of them (see also physical attractiveness stereotype).[76]
Illusion of asymmetric insight People perceive their knowledge of their peers to surpass their peers' knowledge of them.[77]
Illusion of external agency When people view self-generated preferences as instead being caused by insightful, effective and benevolent agents
Illusion of transparency People overestimate others' ability to know them, and they also overestimate their ability to know others.
Illusory superiority Overestimating one's desirable qualities, and underestimating undesirable qualities, relative to other people. (Also known as "Lake Wobegon effect", "better-than-average effect", or "superiority bias".)[78]
Ingroup bias The tendency for people to give preferential treatment to others they perceive to be members of their own groups.
公正世界仮説 Just-world hypothesis The tendency for people to want to believe that the world is fundamentally just, causing them to rationalize an otherwise inexplicable injustice as deserved by the victim(s).
Moral luck The tendency for people to ascribe greater or lesser moral standing based on the outcome of an event.
Naïve cynicism Expecting more egocentric bias in others than in oneself.
Naïve realism The belief that we see reality as it really is – objectively and without bias; that the facts are plain for all to see; that rational people will agree with us; and that those who don't are either uninformed, lazy, irrational, or biased.
外集団同質性バイアス Outgroup homogeneity bias Individuals see members of their own group as being relatively more varied than members of other groups.[79]
自己奉仕バイアス Self-serving bias The tendency to claim more responsibility for successes than failures. It may also manifest itself as a tendency for people to evaluate ambiguous information in a way beneficial to their interests (see also group-serving bias).[80]
Shared information bias Known as the tendency for group members to spend more time and energy discussing information that all members are already familiar with (i.e., shared information), and less time and energy discussing information that only some members are aware of (i.e., unshared information).[81]
Sociability bias of language The disproportionally higher representation of words related to social interactions, in comparison to words related to physical or mental aspects of behavior, in most languages. This bias attributed to nature of language as a tool facilitating human interactions. When verbal descriptors of human behavior are used as a source of information, sociability bias of such descriptors emerges in factor-analytic studies as a factor related to pro-social behavior (for example, of Extraversion factor in the Big Five personality traits [52]
System justification The tendency to defend and bolster the status quo. Existing social, economic, and political arrangements tend to be preferred, and alternatives disparaged, sometimes even at the expense of individual and collective self-interest. (See also status quo bias.)
Trait ascription bias The tendency for people to view themselves as relatively variable in terms of personality, behavior, and mood while viewing others as much more predictable.
Ultimate attribution error Similar to the fundamental attribution error, in this error a person is likely to make an internal attribution to an entire group instead of the individuals within the group.
Worse-than-average effect A tendency to believe ourselves to be worse than others at tasks which are difficult.[82]

Memory errors and biases[編集]

詳細は「List of memory biases」を参照

In psychology and cognitive science, a memory bias is a cognitive bias that either enhances or impairs the recall of a memory (either the chances that the memory will be recalled at all, or the amount of time it takes for it to be recalled, or both), or that alters the content of a reported memory. There are many types of memory bias, including:

名前 英語名 説明
Bizarreness effect Bizarre material is better remembered than common material.
Choice-supportive bias In a self-justifying manner retroactively ascribing one's choices to be more informed than they were when they were made.
Change bias After an investment of effort in producing change, remembering one's past performance as more difficult than it actually was[83][信頼性要検証]
幼児期健忘 Childhood amnesia The retention of few memories from before the age of four.
Conservatism or Regressive bias　※上にもconservatismってある Tendency to remember high values and high likelihoods/probabilities/frequencies as lower than they actually were and low ones as higher than they actually were. Based on the evidence, memories are not extreme enough[64][65]
Consistency bias Incorrectly remembering one's past attitudes and behaviour as resembling present attitudes and behaviour.[84]
Context effect That cognition and memory are dependent on context, such that out-of-context memories are more difficult to retrieve than in-context memories (e.g., recall time and accuracy for a work-related memory will be lower at home, and vice versa)
Cross-race effect The tendency for people of one race to have difficulty identifying members of a race other than their own.
Cryptomnesia A form of misattribution where a memory is mistaken for imagination, because there is no subjective experience of it being a memory.[83]
Egocentric bias Recalling the past in a self-serving manner, e.g., remembering one's exam grades as being better than they were, or remembering a caught fish as bigger than it really was.
Fading affect bias A bias in which the emotion associated with unpleasant memories fades more quickly than the emotion associated with positive events.[85]
虚偽記憶 False memory A form of misattribution where imagination is mistaken for a memory.
Generation effect (Self-generation effect) That self-generated information is remembered best. For instance, people are better able to recall memories of statements that they have generated than similar statements generated by others.
Google effect The tendency to forget information that can be found readily online by using Internet search engines.
後知恵バイアス上にもあったけど Hindsight bias The inclination to see past events as being more predictable than they actually were; also called the "I-knew-it-all-along" effect.
Humor effect That humorous items are more easily remembered than non-humorous ones, which might be explained by the distinctiveness of humor, the increased cognitive processing time to understand the humor, or the emotional arousal caused by the humor.[86]
Illusion of truth effect That people are more likely to identify as true statements those they have previously heard (even if they cannot consciously remember having heard them), regardless of the actual validity of the statement. In other words, a person is more likely to believe a familiar statement than an unfamiliar one.
錯誤相関上にもあったけど Illusory correlation Inaccurately remembering a relationship between two events.[18][45]
Lag effect The phenomenon whereby learning is greater when studying is spread out over time, as opposed to studying the same amount of time in a single session. See also spacing effect.
Leveling and sharpening Memory distortions introduced by the loss of details in a recollection over time, often concurrent with sharpening or selective recollection of certain details that take on exaggerated significance in relation to the details or aspects of the experience lost through leveling. Both biases may be reinforced over time, and by repeated recollection or re-telling of a memory.[87]
Levels-of-processing effect That different methods of encoding information into memory have different levels of effectiveness.[88]
List-length effect A smaller percentage of items are remembered in a longer list, but as the length of the list increases, the absolute number of items remembered increases as well. For example, consider a list of 30 items ("L30") and a list of 100 items ("L100"). An individual may remember 15 items from L30, or 50%, whereas the individual may remember 40 items from L100, or 40%. Although the percent of L30 items remembered (50%) is greater than the percent of L100 (40%), more L100 items (40) are remembered than L30 items (15).[89]Template:Further explanation needed
Misinformation effect Memory becoming less accurate because of interference from post-event information.[90]
Modality effect That memory recall is higher for the last items of a list when the list items were received via speech than when they were received through writing.
Mood-congruent memory bias The improved recall of information congruent with one's current mood.
Next-in-line effect People taking turns speaking in a group tend to have diminished recall for Template:Clarify span who spoke immediately before them.[91]
Part-list cueing effect That being shown some items from a list and later retrieving one item causes it to become harder to retrieve the other items.[92]
ピーク・エンドの法則 Peak-end rule That people seem to perceive not the sum of an experience but the average of how it was at its peak (e.g., pleasant or unpleasant) and how it ended.
Persistence The unwanted recurrence of memories of a traumatic event.[要出典]
Picture superiority effect The notion that concepts that are learned by viewing pictures are more easily and frequently recalled than are concepts that are learned by viewing their written word form counterparts.[93][94][95][96][97][98]
(社会情動的選択性理論) Positivity effect (Socioemotional selectivity theory) That older adults favor positive over negative information in their memories.
Primacy effect, recency effect & serial position effect That items near the end of a sequence are the easiest to recall, followed by the items at the beginning of a sequence; items in the middle are the least likely to be remembered.[99]
Processing difficulty effect That information that takes longer to read and is thought about more (processed with more difficulty) is more easily remembered.[100]
Reminiscence bump The recalling of more personal events from adolescence and early adulthood than personal events from other lifetime periods[101]
Rosy retrospection The remembering of the past as having been better than it really was.
Self-relevance effect That memories relating to the self are better recalled than similar information relating to others.
Source confusion Confusing episodic memories with other information, creating distorted memories.[102]
Spacing effect That information is better recalled if exposure to it is repeated over a long span of time rather than a short one.
Spotlight effect The tendency to overestimate the amount that other people notice your appearance or behavior.
Stereotypical bias Memory distorted towards stereotypes (e.g., racial or gender)
Suffix effect Diminishment of the recency effect because a sound item is appended to the list that the subject is not required to recall.[103][104]
Suggestibility A form of misattribution where ideas suggested by a questioner are mistaken for memory.
Tachypsychia When time perceived by the individual either lengthens, making events appear to slow down, or contracts.[105]
Telescoping effect The tendency to displace recent events backward in time and remote events forward in time, so that recent events appear more remote, and remote events, more recent.
テスト効果 Testing effect The fact that you more easily remember information you have read by rewriting it instead of rereading it.[106]
舌先現象 Tip of the tongue phenomenon When a subject is able to recall parts of an item, or related information, but is frustratingly unable to recall the whole item. This is thought to be an instance of "blocking" where multiple similar memories are being recalled and interfere with each other.[83]
Travis Syndrome Overestimating the significance of the present.[107] It is related to the enlightenment Idea of Progress and chronological snobbery with possibly an appeal to novelty logical fallacy being part of the bias.
Verbatim effect That the "gist" of what someone has said is better remembered than the verbatim wording.[108] This is because memories are representations, not exact copies.
von Restorff effect That an item that sticks out is more likely to be remembered than other items[109]
ツァイガルニク効果 Zeigarnik effect That uncompleted or interrupted tasks are remembered better than completed ones.

Common theoretical causes of some cognitive biases[編集]

A 2012 Psychological Bulletin article suggested that at least eight seemingly unrelated biases can be produced by the same information-theoretic generative mechanism that assumes noisy information processing during storage and retrieval of information in human memory.[18]

Individual differences in decision making biases[編集]

People do appear to have stable individual differences in their susceptibility to decision biases such as overconfidence, temporal discounting, and bias blind spot.[112] That said, these stable levels of bias within individuals are possible to change. Participants in experiments who watched training videos and played debiasing games showed medium to large reductions both immediately and up to three months later in the extent to which they exhibited susceptibility to six cognitive biases: anchoring, bias blind spot, confirmation bias, fundamental attribution error, projection bias, and representativeness.[113]

Debiasing[編集]

Debiasing is the reduction of biases in judgment and decision making through incentives, nudges, and training. Cognitive bias mitigation and cognitive bias modification are forms of debiasing specifically applicable to cognitive biases and their effects.

See also[編集]

Sociology
ポータル Psychology

Notes[編集]

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References[編集]

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