利用者:Caspar/sandbox

Bangladesh Liberation War
時March 26, 1971 - December 16, 1971
場所Bangladesh
結果

• Decisive Indian and Bangladeshi victory

• Independence of Bangladesh
領土の
変化		 East Pakistan becomes Bangladesh
衝突した勢力
バングラデシュの旗 Mukti Bahini
インドの旗 India		 パキスタンの旗 Pakistan
指揮官
バングラデシュの旗 Col. M A G Osmani
インドの旗 General Jagjit Singh Aurora
インドの旗 General Sam Manekshaw		 パキスタンの旗 General A. A. K. Niazi
パキスタンの旗 General Tikka Khan
戦力
India: 250,000 [1]
Mukti Bahini: 100,000[1][2]

Pakistan Army: ~ 100,000[要出典]

Para Military: ~25,000[3]
被害者数

India: 1,426 KIA
3,611 Wounded (Official)
1,525 KIA
4,061 Wounded [4]


Mukti Bahini: 300,0000 died.

Pakistan ~8,000 KIA[要出典]
~10,000 Wounded[要出典]
91,000 POWs
(56,694 Armed Forces
12,192 Paramilitary
rest civilians)[4]

[5]
Civilian death toll: Estimates exist between 26,000[6] and 3,000,000[7]

The Bangladesh Liberation War(i) (মুক্তিযুদ্ধ or Mukti Juddho in Bengali), was a war between West Pakistan (now Pakistan) and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), from 26 March until 16 December 1971. The war started as an insurgency in East Pakistan. Indian support for the insurgency resulted in war between India and Pakistan (the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971), during which the Indian military and East Pakistanis decisively defeated the West Pakistani forces deployed in the East. The war resulted in East Pakistan's independence as the new nation of Bangladesh.

Background[編集]

In August 1947 the Partition of India, gave birth to a new country named Pakistan containing the Muslim-majority areas. These were two geographically and culturally separate areas in far east and the far west of the Indian subcontinent, separated by over a thousand miles of Indian territory. The Western zone was popularly (and for a period of time, also officially) termed West Pakistan and the Eastern zone (modern-day Bangladesh) was initially termed East Bengal and later, East Pakistan. It was widely perceived that West Pakistan dominated politically and exploited the East economically, leading to many grievences.

On the 25th March 1971, rising political discontent and cultural nationalism in East Pakistan was met by brutal[8] suppressive force from the ruling elite of the West Pakistan establishment[9] in what came to be termed Operation Searchlight.[10]

The violent crackdown by West Pakistan forces[11] led to to East Pakistan declaring its independence as the state of Bangladesh and to the start of civil war. The war led to a sea of refugees (estimated at the time to be about 10million)[12][13] flooding into the eastern provinces of India[12]. Facing a mounting humanitarian and economic crisis, India started actively aiding and organising the Bangladeshi resistance army known as the Mukti Bahini.

List of East Pakistani Grievances[編集]

Economic exploitation[編集]

West Pakistan (consisting of four provinces: Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan and North-West Frontier Province) dominated the divided country politically and received more money from the common budget than the more populous East.

Year Spending on West Pakistan (in crore Rupees) Spending on East Pakistan (in crore Rupees) Amount spent on East as percentage of West
1950–55 1,129 524 46.4
1955–60 1,655 524 31.7
1960–65 3,355 1,404 41.8
1965–70 5,195 2,141 41.2
Total 11,334 4,593 40.5
Source: Reports of the Advisory Panels for the Fourth Five Year Plan 1970-75, Vol. I, published by the planning commission of Pakistan (Quick reference: crore = 107, or 10 million)

Political differences[編集]

Although East Pakistan accounted for a majority of the country's population, political power remained firmly in the hands of West Pakistanis, specifically the Punjabis. Since a straightforward system of representation based on population would have concentrated political power in East Pakistan, the West Pakistani establishment came up with the "One Unit" scheme, where all of West Pakistan was considered one province. This was solely to counterbalance the East wing's votes. Ironically, after the East broke away to form Bangladesh, the Punjab province insisted that politics in West Pakistan now be decided on the basis of a straightforward vote, since Punjabis were more numerous than the other groups, such as Sindhis, Pashtuns, or Balochs.

After the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan's first prime minister, in 1951, political power began to be concentrated in the President of Pakistan, and eventually, the military. The nominal elected chief executive, the Prime Minister, was frequently sacked by the establishment, acting through the President.

East Pakistanis noticed that whenever one of them, such as Khawaja Nazimuddin, Muhammad Ali Bogra, or Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy were elected Prime Minister of Pakistan, they were swiftly deposed by the largely West Pakistani establishment. The military dictatorships of Ayub Khan (27 October 1958 - 25 March 1969) and Yahya Khan (25 March 1969 - 20 December 1971), both West Pakistanis, only heightened such feelings.

ファイル:Mujib7March.jpg
Historic Speech of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on March 7, 1971

The situation reached a climax when in 1970 the Awami League, the largest East Pakistani political party, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, won a landslide victory in the national elections. The party won 160 of the 162 seats allotted to East Pakistan, and thus a majority of the 300 seats in the National Assembly. This gave the Awami League the constitutional right to form a government. However, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the leader of the Pakistan People's Party, refused to allow Rahman to become the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Instead, he proposed the idea of having two Prime Ministers, one for each wing. The proposal elicited outrage in the east wing, already chafing under the other constitutional innovation, the "one unit scheme." Bhutto also refused to accept Rahman's Six Points. On 3 March 1971, the two leaders of the two wings along with the President General Yahya Khan met in Dhaka to decide the fate of the country. Talks failed. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman called for a nation-wide strike.

On March 7 1971, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman delivered a speech at the Racecourse Ground (now called the Suhrawardy Udyan). In this speech he mentioned a further four-point condition to consider the National Assembly Meeting on March 25:

  1. The immediate lifting of martial law.
  2. Immediate withdrawal of all military personnel to their barracks.
  3. An inquiry into the loss of life.
  4. Immediate transfer of power to the elected representative of the people before the assembly meeting March 25.

He urged "his people" to turn every house into a fort of resistance. He closed his speech saying, "Our struggle is for our freedom. Our struggle is for our independence." This speech is considered the main event that inspired the nation to fight for their independence. General Tikka Khan was flown in to Dhaka to become Governor of East Bengal. East-Pakistani judges, including Justice Siddique, refused to swear him in.

Between 10 and 13 March, Pakistan International Airlines cancelled all their international routes to urgently fly "Government Passengers" to Dhaka. These "Government Passengers" were almost all Pakistani soldiers in civilian dress. MV Swat, a ship of the Pakistani Navy, carrying ammunition and soldiers, was harboured in Chittagong Port and the Bengali workers and sailors at the port refused to unload the ship. A unit of East Pakistan Rifles refused to obey commands to fire on Bengali demonstrators, beginning a mutiny of Bengali soldiers.

Military imbalance[編集]

Bengalis were underepresented in the Pakistan military. Officers of Bengali origin in the different wings of the armed forces made up just 5% of overall force by 1965; of these, only a few were in command positions, with the majority in technical or administrative posts.[14] West Pakistanis believed that Bengalis were not "martially inclined" unlike Pashtuns and Punjabis; the "martial races" notion was dismissed as ridiculous and humiliating by Bengalis.[14] Moreover, despite huge defence spending, East Pakistan received none of the benefits, such as contracts, purchasing and military support jobs. The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 over Kashmir also highlighted the sense of military insecurity among Bengalis as only an under-strength infantry division and 15 combat aircraft without tank support were in East Pakistan to thwart any Indian retaliations during the conflict.[15][16]

Language controversy[編集]

詳細は「Bengali Language Movement」を参照

In 1948, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan's first Governor-General, declared in Dhaka (then usually spelled Dacca in English) that "Urdu, and only Urdu" would be the sole official language for all of Pakistan.[17] This proved highly controversial, since Urdu was a language that was only spoken in the West by Muhajir and in the East by Biharis. The majority groups in West Pakistan spoke Punjabi and Sindhi, while Bangla was spoken by the majority of East Pakistanis.[18] The language controversy eventually reached a point where East Pakistan revolted. Several students and civilians lost their lives in a police crackdown on February 21, 1952.[18] The day is revered in Bangladesh and in West Bengal as the Language Martyrs' Day. Later, in memory of the 1952 killings, UNESCO declared February 21 as the International Mother Language Day in 1999.[19]

In West Pakistan, the movement was seen as a sectional uprising against Pakistani national interests.[20] and the founding ideology of Pakistan, the Two-Nation Theory.[21] West Pakistani politicians considered Urdu a product of Indian Islamic culture,[22] as Ayub Khan said, as late as in 1967, "East Bengalis...still are under considerable Hindu culture and influence."[22] But, the deaths led to bitter feelings among East Pakistanis, and they were a major factor in the push for independence.[22][21]

Handling of the 1970 Bhola cyclone[編集]

The 1970 Bhola cyclone made landfall on the East Pakistan coastline during the evening of November 12, around the same time as a local high tide,[23] killing an estimated number of people between 300,000 and 500,000, though the exact death toll is not known to become the deadliest tropical cyclone on record.[24] A week after the landfall, President Khan conceded that his government had made "slips" and "mistakes" in its handling of the relief efforts for a lack of understanding of the magnitude of the disaster.[25]

A statement released by eleven political leaders in East Pakistan ten days after the cyclone hit charged the government with "gross neglect, callous indifference and utter indifference". They also accused the president of playing down the news coverage.[26] On November 19, students held a march in Dhaka in protest of the speed of the government response[27] and Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani addressed a rally of 50,000 people on November 24, where he accused the president of inefficiency and demanded his resignation.

As the conflict between East and West Pakistan developed in March, the Dhaka offices of the two government organisations directly involved in relief efforts were closed for at least two weeks, first by a general strike and then by a ban on government work in East Pakistan by the Awami League. With this increase in tension, foreign personnel evacuated due to fears of violence. Relief work continued in the field, but the long-term planning was curtailed.[28] This conflict widened into the Bangladesh Liberation War in December and concluded with the creation of Bangladesh. This is one of the first times that a natural event helped to trigger a civil war.[29]

Operation Searchlight: 25 March 1971[編集]

詳細は「Operation Searchlight」を参照

A planned military pacification carried out by the Pakistan Army — codenamed Operation Searchlight — started on 25 March to curb the Bengali nationalist movement[30] by taking control of the major cities on March 26, and then eliminating all opposition, political or military[31], within one month. Before the beginning of the operation, all foreign journalists were systematically deported from Bangladesh [要出典]. The main phase of Operation Searchlight ended with the fall of the last major town in Bengali hands in mid May. The operation also began the 1971 Bangladesh atrocities. These systematic killings served only to enrage the Bengalis, which ultimately resulted in the secession of East Pakistan later in the same year. The international media and reference books in English have published casualty figures which vary greatly, from 5,000–35,000 in Dhaka, and 200,000–3,000,000 for Bangladesh as a whole.[7][32]

According to the Asia Times,[33]

At a meeting of the military top brass, Yahya Khan declared: "Kill 3 million of them and the rest will eat out of our hands." Accordingly, on the night of 25 March, the Pakistani Army launched Operation Searchlight to "crush" Bengali resistance in which Bengali members of military services were disarmed and killed, students and the intelligentsia systematically liquidated and able-bodied Bengali males just picked up and gunned down.

Although the violence focused on the provincial capital, Dhaka, the process of ethnic elimination was also carried out all around Bangladesh. Residential halls of University of Dhaka were particularly targeted. The only Hindu residential hall — the Jagannath Hall — was destroyed by the Pakistani armed forces, and an estimated 600 to 700 of its residents were murdered. The Pakistani army denies any cold blooded killings at the university, though the Hamood-ur-Rehman commission in Pakistan states that overwhelming force was used at the university. This fact and the massacre at Jagannath Hall and nearby student dormitories of Dhaka University are corroborated by a videotape secretly filmed by Prof. Nur Ullah of the East Pakistan Engineering University, whose residence was directly opposite the student dormitories. [34]

Hindu areas all over Bangladesh suffered particularly heavy blows. By midnight, Dhaka was literally burning, especially the Hindu dominated eastern part of the city. Time magazine reported on August 2, 1971, "The Hindus, who account for three-fourths of the refugees and a majority of the dead, have borne the brunt of the Pakistani military hatred."

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was arrested by the Pakistani Army. Yahya Khan appointed Brigadier Rahimuddin Khan (later General) to preside over a special tribunal charging Mujib with multiple charges. Rahimuddin sentenced Mujib to death, but Yahya put the verdict into abeyance. Other Awami League leaders were arrested as well, while a few fled Dhaka to avoid arrest. The Awami League was banned by General Yahya Khan.

Declaration of independence: 26 March 1971[編集]

The violence unleashed by the Pakistani forces on March 25, 1971, proved the last straw to the efforts to negotiate a settlement. Following these outrages, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman signed an official declaration that read:

Today Bangladesh is a sovereign and independent country. On Thursday night, West Pakistani armed forces suddenly attacked the police barracks at Razarbagh and the EPR headquarters at Pilkhana in Dhaka. Many innocent and unarmed have been killed in Dhaka city and other places of Bangladesh. Violent clashes between E.P.R. and Police on the one hand and the armed forces of Pakistan on the other, are going on. The Bengalis are fighting the enemy with great courage for an independent Bangladesh. May Allah aid us in our fight for freedom. Joy[35] Bangla.[36]

Sheikh Mujib also called upon the people to resist the occupation forces through a radio message.[37] Mujib was arrested on the night of March 25-26, 1971 at about 1:30 a.m. (as per Radio Pakistan’s news on March 29, 1971).

A telegram containing the text of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's declaration reached some students in Chittagong. The message was translated to Bangla by Dr. Manjula Anwar. The students failed to secure permission from higher authorities to broadcast the message from the nearby Agrabad Station of Radio Pakistan. They crossed Kalurghat Bridge into an area controlled by an East Bengal Regiment under Major Ziaur Rahman. Bengali soldiers guarded the station as engineers prepared for transmission. At 19:45 hrs on 27 March, 1971, Major Ziaur Rahman broadcast another announcement of the declaration of independence on behalf of Sheikh Mujibur which is as follows.

This is Shadhin Bangla Betar Kendro. I, Major Ziaur Rahman, at the direction of Bangobondhu sheikh Mujibur Rahman, hereby declare that the independent People's Republic of Bangladesh has been established. At his direction, I have taken command as the temporary Head of the Republic. In the name of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, I call upon all Bengalis to rise against the attack by the West Pakistani Army. We shall fight to the last to free our Motherland. By the grace of Allah, victory is ours. Joy Bangla. Audio of Zia's announcement (interview - Belal Mohammed)

The Kalurghat Radio Station's transmission capability was limited. The message was picked up by a Japanese ship in Bay of Bengal. It was then re-transmitted by Radio Australia and later by the British Broadcasting Corporation.

M A Hannan, an Awami League leader from Chittagong, is said to have made the first announcement of the declaration of independence over the radio on 26 March 1971[38]. There is controversy now as to when Major Zia gave his speech. BNP sources maintain that it was the 26th of March, and there was no message regarding declaration of independence from Mujibur Rahman. Pakistani sources, like Siddiq Salik in "Witness to Surrender" had written that he heard about Mujibor Rahman's message on the Radio while Operation Searchlight was going on, and Maj. Gen. Hakeem A. Qureshi in his book "The 1971 Indo-Pak War: A Soldier's Narrative", gives the date of Zia's speech as 27 March 1971 in Annex M (Oxford University Press, 2002 ISBN 0-19-579778-7).

March 26, 1971, is considered the official Independence Day of Bangladesh, and the name Bangladesh was in effect henceforth. In July 1971, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi openly referred to the former East Pakistan as Bangladesh.[39] Some Pakistani and Indian officials continued to use the name "East Pakistan" until 16 December, 1971.

Civil War: 27 March to 2nd December 1971[編集]

March 26 to June[編集]

ファイル:BDPam.jpg
Leaflets and pamphlets played an important role in driving public opinion during the war.

At first resistance was spontaneous and disorganized, and was not expected to be prolonged.[40] But when the Pakistani Army cracked down upon the population, resistance grew. The Mukti Bahini were became increasingly active. The Pakistani military sought to quell them, but increasing numbers of Bengali soldiers defected to the underground "Bangladesh army". These Bengali units slowly merged into the Mukti Bahini and bolstered their weaponry with supplies from India. Pakistan responded by airlifting in two infantry divisions and reorganizing their forces. They also raised paramilitary forces of Razakars, Al-Badrs and Al-Shams (who were mostly members of Jamaat-e-Islami and other Islamist groups), as well as other Bengalis who opposed independence, and Bihari Muslims who had settled during the time of partition.The Bangladesh government-in-exile was formed on April 17 at Mujib Nagar.

June-September[編集]

The eleven sectors

Bangladesh forces command was set up in July 11, with Col. M A G Osmani as commander in chief, Lt. Col. Abdur Rab as chief of Army Staff and Group Captain A K Khandker as Deputy Chief of Army Staff and Chief of Air Force.

Bangladesh was divided into Eleven Sectors each with a commander chosen from defected officers of Pakistan army who joined the Mukti Bahini to conduct guerrilla operations and train fighters. Most of their training camps were situated near the border area and were operated with assistance from India. The 10th Sector was directly placed under Commander in Chief (C-in-C) and included the Naval Commandos and C-in-C’s special force.[41] Three brigades (11 Battalions) were raised for conventional warfare; a large guerrilla force (estimated 100,000) was trained.

Guerrilla operations, which slacked during the training phase, picked up after August. Economic and Military targets in Dhaka were attacked. The major success story was Operation Jackpot, in which naval commandos mined and blew up berthed ships in Chittagong on August 16, 1971. Pakistani reprisals claimed lives of thousands of civilians. The Indian army took over supplying the Mukti Bahini from the BSF. They organised 6 sectors for supplying the Bangladesh forces.

October - December[編集]

Bangladesh conventional forces attacked border outposts. Kamalpur, Belonia and Battle of Boyra are a few examples. 90 out of 370 BOPs fell to Bengali forces. Guerrilla attacks intensified, as did Pakistani and Razakar reprisals on civilian populations. Pakistani forces were reinforced by eight battalions from West Pakistan. The Bangladeshi freedom fighters even managed to temporarily capture airstrips at Lalmonirhat and Shalutikar.[42] Both of these were used for flying in supplies and arms from India. Pakistan sent 5 battalions from West Pakistan as reinforcements.

Indian Intervention: December 3-December 16[編集]

Illustration showing military units and troop movements during the war.
「Indo-Pakistani War of 1971」も参照

Major battles

Wary of the growing involvement of India, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) launched a pre-emptive strike on India. The attack was modelled on the Operation Focus employed by Israel Air Force during the Six-Day War. However, the plan failed to achieve the desired success and was seen as an open act of unprovoked aggression against the Indians.

Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi, declared war on Pakistan and in aid of the Mukti Bahini, then ordered the immediate mobilisation of troops and launched the full scale invasion. This marked the official start of the Indo-Pakistani War.

ファイル:0147.jpg
Indian Army's T-55 tanks on their way to Dhaka. India's military intervention played a crucial role in turning the tide in favour of the Bangladeshi rebels.

Three Indian Corps were involved in the invasion of East Pakistan. They were supported by nearly 3 brigades of Mukti Bahini fighting alongside them, and many more fighting irregularly. This was far superior to the Pakistani army of three divisions[43]. The Indians quickly overran the country, bypassing heavily defended strongholds. Pakistani forces were unable to effectively counter the Indian attack because they had been deployed in small units around the border to counter guerrilla attacks by the Mukti Bahini.[44] Unable to effectively defend Dacca, the Pakistanis surrendered on 16 December 1971.

ファイル:IndianArmour.jpg
Indian Army troops in action during the war

India's external intelligence agency, the R.A.W., played a crucial role in providing logistic support to the Mukti Bahini during the initial stages of the war. RAW's operations in then East Pakistan, was the largest covert mission in the history of South Asia.[要出典]

Pakistani Response[編集]

Pakistan launched a number of armoured thrusts along India's western front in attempts to force Indian troops away from East Pakistan. Pakistan tried to fight back and boost the sagging morale by incorporating the Special Services Group commandos in sabotage and rescue missions. This however could not stop the juggernaut of the advancing columns whose speed and power were too much to contain for the Pakistani Army.

The Air and Naval War[編集]

The Indian Air Force carried out several sorties against Pakistan and within a week, IAF aircraft dominated the skies of East Pakistan. It achieved near total air supremacy by the end of the first week as the entire the Pakistani air contingent in the east, PAF No.14 Squadron, was grounded due to Indian airstrikes at Tejgaon, Kurmitolla, Lal Munir Hat and Shamsher Nagar. Sea Hawks from INS Vikrant also struck Chittagong, Barisal, Cox's Bazar, destroying the eastern wing of the Pakistan Navy and effectively blockading the East Pakistan ports, thereby cutting off any escape routes for the stranded Pakistani soldiers. The nascent Bangladesh Navy (comprising officers and sailors who defected from Pakistani Navy) aided the Indians in the marine warfare, carrying out attacks, most notably Operation Jackpot.

Surrender and Aftermath: 16 December 1971[編集]

ファイル:1971 surrender.jpg
Pakistan's Lt. Gen A. A. K. Niazi signs the instrument of surrender on December 16, surrendering his forces to Lt. Gen Jagjit Singh Aurora commanding the Mitro Bahini.
ファイル:InstrumentOfSurrender.jpg
Indian Lt. Gen J.S. Aurora and Pakistani Lt. Gen A.A.K. Niazi's signatures on the Instrument of Surrender.

After Pakistan's surrender late on 16 December 1971, people in Bangladesh rejoiced at their liberation. This was followed by a need to get international acceptance for Bangladesh, as only a few countries recognized the new nation. Bangladesh sought admission in the UN with most voting in its favor, but China vetoed this as Pakistan was its key ally.[45] However, the United States was one of the last nations to accord Bangladesh recognition.[46] To ensure a smooth transition, in 1972 the Simla Agreement was signed between India and Pakistan. The treaty ensured that Pakistan recognized the independence of Bangladesh in exchange for the return of the Pakistani PoWs. India treated all the PoWs in strict accordance with the Geneva Convention, rule 1925. It released more than 90,000 Pakistani PoWs in five months.

Further, as a gesture of goodwill, nearly 200 soldiers who were sought for war crimes by Bengalis were also pardoned by India. The accord also gave back more than 13,000 km² of land that Indian troops had seized in West Pakistan during the war, though Indian retained a few strategic areas;[47] most notably Kargil (which would in turn again be the focal point for a war between the two nations in 1999). This was done as a measure of promoting "lasting peace" and was acknowledged by many observers as a sign of maturity by India. But some in India felt that the treaty had been too lenient to Bhutto, who had pleaded for leniency, arguing that the fragile democracy in Pakistan would crumble if the accord was perceived as being overly harsh by Pakistanis.

Reaction in West Pakistan to the war[編集]

Reaction to the defeat and dismemberment of half the nation was a shocking loss to top military and civilians alike. No one had expected that they would lose the formal war in under a fortnight and were also very angry at what they perceived as a meek surrender of the army in East Pakistan. Yahya Khan's dictatorship collapsed and gave way to Bhutto who took the opportunity to rise to power. General Niazi, who surrendered along with 93,000 troops, was viewed with suspicion and hatred upon his return to Pakistan. He was shunned and branded a traitor. The war also exposed the shortcoming of Pakistan's declared strategic doctrine that the "defence of East Pakistan lay in West Pakistan".[48] Pakistan also failed to gather international support, and were found fighting a lone battle with only the USA providing any external help. This further embittered the Pakistanis who had faced the worst military defeat of an army in decades.

The debacle immediately prompted an enquiry headed by Justice Hamdoor Rahman. Called the Hamoodur Rahman Commission, it was initially suppressed by Bhutto as it put the military in poor light. When it was declassified, it showed many failings from the strategic to the tactical levels. It also condemned the atrocities and the war crimes committed by the armed forces. It confirmed the looting, rapes and the killings by the Pakistan Army and their local agents although the figures are far lower than the ones quoted by Bangladesh. According to Bangladeshi souces, 200,000 women were raped and over 3 million people were killed, while the Rahman Commission report in Pakistan claimed 26,000 died and the rapes were in the hundreds. However, the army’s role in splintering Pakistan after its greatest military debacle was largely ignored by successive Pakistani governments.

Atrocities[編集]

詳細は「1971 Bangladesh atrocities」を参照

During the war there were widespread killings and other atrocities – including the displacement of civilians in Bangladesh (East Pakistan at the time) and widespread violations of human rights – carried out by the Pakistan Army with support from political and religious militias began with the start of Operation Searchlight on 25 March 1971.

Bangladeshi authorities claim that 3 million people were killed,[7] while the the Hamoodur Rahman Commission, an official Pakistan Government investigation, put the figure as low as 26,000 civilian casualties.[6] The international media and reference books in English have also published figures which vary greatly from 200,000 to 3,000,000 for Bangladesh as a whole.[7] A further eight to ten million people fled the country to seek safety in India.[49]

A large section of the intellectual community of Bangladesh were murdered, mostly by the Al-Shams and Al-Badr forces,[50] at the instruction of the Pakistani Army.[51] There are many mass graves in Bangladesh, and more are continually being discovered (such as one in an old well near a mosque in Dhaka, located in the non-Bengali region of the city, which was discovered in August 1999).[52] The first night of war on Bengalis, which is documented in telegrams from the American Consulate in Dhaka to the United States State Department, saw indiscriminate killings of students of Dhaka University and other civilians.[53]

Numerous women were tortured, raped and killed during the war; the exact numbers are not known and are a subject of debate. Bangladeshi sources cite a figure of 200,000 women raped, giving birth to thousands of war-babies. The Pakistan Army also kept numerous Bengali women as sex-slaves inside the Dhaka Cantonment. Most of the girls were captured from Dhaka University and private homes.[54]

There was significant sectarian violence not only perpetrated and encouraged by the Pakistani army,[55] but also by Bengali nationalists against non-Bengali minorities, especially Biharis.[56]

On December 16, 2002, the George Washington University's National Security Archive published a collection of declassified documents, consisting mostly of communications between US embassy officials and USIS centers in Dhaka and India, and officials in Washington DC.[57] These documents show that US officials working in diplomatic institutions within Bangladesh used the terms selective genocide[58] and genocide (see The Blood Telegram) to describe events they had knowledge of at the time. Genocide is the term that is still used to describe the event in almost every major publication and newspaper in Bangladesh.[59][60], although elsewhere, particularly in Pakistan, the actual death toll, motives, extent, and destructive impact of the actions of the Pakistani forces are disputed.

Foreign reaction[編集]

USA and USSR[編集]

The United States supported Pakistan both politically and materially. U.S. President Richard Nixon denied getting involved in the situation, saying that it was an internal matter of Pakistan. But when Pakistan's defeat seemed certain, Nixon sent the USS Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal, a move deemed by the Indians as a nuclear threat. Enterprise arrived on station on December 11, 1971. On 6 December and 13 December, the Soviet Navy dispatched two groups of ships, armed with nuclear missiles, from Vladivostok; they trailed U.S. Task Force 74 in the Indian Ocean from 18 December until 7 January 1972.

The Nixon administration provided support to Pakistan President Yahya Khan during the turmoil.

Nixon and Henry Kissinger feared Soviet expansion into South and Southeast Asia. Pakistan was a close ally of the People's Republic of China, with whom Nixon had been negotiating a rapprochement and where he intended to visit in February 1972. Nixon feared that an Indian invasion of West Pakistan would mean total Soviet domination of the region, and that it would seriously undermine the global position of the United States and the regional position of America's new tacit ally, China. In order to demonstrate to China the bona fides of the United States as an ally, and in direct violation of the US Congress-imposed sanctions on Pakistan, Nixon sent military supplies to Pakistan and routed them through Jordan and Iran,[61] while also encouraging China to increase its arms supplies to Pakistan.

The Nixon administration also ignored reports it received of the genocidal activities of the Pakistani Army in East Pakistan, most notably the Blood telegram.

The Soviet Union had sympathized with the Bangladeshis, and supported the Indian Army and Mukti Bahini during the war, recognizing that the independence of Bangladesh would weaken the position of its rivals - the United States and China. It gave assurances to India that if a confrontation with the United States or China developed, the USSR would take counter-measures. This was enshrined in the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty signed in August 1971. The Soviets also sent a nuclear submarine to ward off the threat posed by USS Enterprise in the Indian Ocean.

China[編集]

As a long-standing ally of Pakistan, the People's Republic of China reacted with alarm to the evolving situation in East Pakistan and the prospect of India invading West Pakistan and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. Believing that just such an Indian attack was imminent, Nixon encouraged China to mobilize its armed forces along its border with India to discourage such an eventuality; the Chinese did not, however, respond in this manner and instead threw their weight behind demands for an immediate ceasefire. China did, however, continue to supply Pakistan with arms and aid. It is believed that had China taken action against India to protect West Pakistan then the Soviet Union would have taken military action against China. One Pakistani writer has speculated that China chose not to attack India because Himalayan passes were snowbound in the wintery months of November and December.[62]

United Nations[編集]

Though the United Nations condemned the human rights violations, it failed to defuse the situation politically before the start of the war. The Security Council assembled on December 4 to discuss the volatile situation in South Asia. USSR vetoed the resolution twice. After lengthy discussions on December 7, the General Assembly promptly adopted by a majority resolution calling for an "immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of troops." The United States on December 12 requested that the Security Council be reconvened. However, by the time it was reconvened and proposals were finalised, the war had ended, making the measures merely academic.

The inaction of the United Nations in face of the East Pakistan crisis was widely criticized. The conflict also exposed the delay in decision making that failed to address the underlying issues in time.

関連項目[編集]


脚注[編集]

  1. ^ a b India - Pakistan War, 1971; Introduction - Tom Cooper, Khan Syed Shaiz Ali 引用エラー: 無効な <ref> タグ; name "ACIG"が異なる内容で複数回定義されています
  2. ^ Pakistan & the Karakoram Highway By Owen Bennett-Jones, Lindsay Brown, John Mock, Sarina Singh, Pg 30
  3. ^ p442 Indian Army after Independence by KC Pravel: Lancer 1987 [ISBN 81-7062-014-7]
  4. ^ a b Figures from The Fall of Dacca by Jagjit Singh Aurora in The Illustrated Weekly of India dated Dec 23,1973 quoted in Indian Army after Independence by KC Pravel: Lancer 1987 [ISBN 81-7062-014-7]
  5. ^ Figure from Pakistani Prisioners of War in India by Col S.P. Salunke p.10 quoted in Indian Army after Independence by KC Pravel: Lancer 1987 [ISBN 81-7062-014-7]
  6. ^ a b Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report, chapter 2, paragraph 33
  7. ^ a b c d Matthew White's Death Tolls for the Major Wars and Atrocities of the Twentieth Century 引用エラー: 無効な <ref> タグ; name "MathewWhite"が異なる内容で複数回定義されています
  8. ^ Genocide in Bangladesh, 1971. Gendercide Watch.
  9. ^ Emerging Discontent, 1966-70. Country Studies Bangladesh
  10. ^ Anatomy of Violence: Analysis of Civil War in East Pakistan in 1971: Military Action: Operation Searchlight Bose S Economic and Political Weekly Special Articles, October 8, 2005
  11. ^ The Pakistani Slaughter That Nixon Ignored , Syndicated Column by Sydney Schanberg, New York Times, May 3, 1994
  12. ^ a b Crisis in South Asia - A report by Senator Edward Kennedy to the Subcommittee investigating the Problem of Refugees and Their Settlement, Submitted to U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, November 1, 1971, U.S. Govt. Press.pp6-7 引用エラー: 無効な <ref> タグ; name "report"が異なる内容で複数回定義されています
  13. ^ India and Pakistan: Over the Edge. TIME Dec 13, 1971 Vol. 98 No. 24
  14. ^ a b Library of Congress studies
  15. ^ Demons of December — Road from East Pakistan to Bangladesh
  16. ^ Rounaq Jahan (1972). Pakistan: Failure in National Integration. Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-03625-6  Pg 166-167
  17. ^ Al Helal, Bashir, Language Movement, Banglapedia
  18. ^ a b “Language Movement” (PHP). Banglapedia - The National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh. Asiatic Society of Bangladesh. 2007年2月6日閲覧。
  19. ^ “International Mother Language Day - Background and Adoption of the Resolution”. Government of Bangladesh. 2007年6月21日閲覧。
  20. ^ Rahman, Tariq (September 1997). “Language and Ethnicity in Pakistan”. Asian Survey 37 (9): 833–839. ISSN 0004-4687. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0004-4687(199709)37%3A9%3C833%3ALAEIP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-R 2007年6月21日閲覧。. 
  21. ^ a b Rahman, Tariq (1997). “The Medium of Instruction Controversy in Pakistan” (PDF). Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development 18 (2): 145–154. ISSN 0143-4632. http://www.multilingual-matters.net/jmmd/018/0145/jmmd0180145.pdf 2007年6月21日閲覧。. 
  22. ^ a b c Oldenburg, Philip (August 1985). “"A Place Insufficiently Imagined": Language, Belief, and the Pakistan Crisis of 1971”. The Journal of Asian Studies 44 (4): 711–733. doi:10.2307/2056443. ISSN 0021-9118. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0021-9118(198508)44%3A4%3C711%3A%22PIILB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C 2007年6月21日閲覧。. 
  23. ^ India Meteorological Department (1970年). “Annual Summary - Storms & Depressions” (PDF). India Weather Review 1970. pp. pp. 10-11. 2007年4月15日閲覧。
  24. ^ Kabir, M. M.; Saha B. C.; Hye, J. M. A.. “Cyclonic Storm Surge Modelling for Design of Coastal Polder” (PDF). Institute of Water Modelling. 2007年4月15日閲覧。
  25. ^ Schanberg, Sydney (1970-11-22). “Yahya Condedes 'Slips' In Relief”. New York Times 
  26. ^ Staff writer (1970-11-23). “East Pakistani Leaders Assail Yahya on Cyclone Relief”. New York Times (Reuters) 
  27. ^ Staff writer (1970-11-18). “Copter Shortage Balks Cyclone Aid”. New York Times 
  28. ^ Durdin, Tillman (1971-03-11). “Pakistanis Crisis Virtually Halts Rehabilitation Work In Cyclone Region”. New York Times 
  29. ^ Olson, Richard (2005-02-21). “A Critical Juncture Analysis, 1964-2003” (PDF). USAID. 2007年4月15日閲覧。
  30. ^ Sarmila Bose Anatomy of Violence: Analysis of Civil War in East Pakistan in 1971: Military Action: Operation Searchlight Economic and Political Weekly Special Articles, October 8, 2005
  31. ^ Salik, Siddiq, Witness To Surrender, p63, p228-9 id = ISBN 9-840-51373-7
  32. ^ Virtual Bangladesh : History : The Bangali Genocide, 1971
  33. ^ Debasish Roy Chowdhury (2005年6月23日). “'Indians are bastards anyway'”. Asia Times. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GF23Df04.html 
  34. ^ Malik, Amita (1972). The Year of the Vulture. New Delhi: Orient Longmans. pp. 79-83. ISBN 0804688176 
  35. ^ "Joy" is Bengali Word that means win
  36. ^ J. S. Gupta The History of the Liberation Movement in Bangladesh Page ??
  37. ^ The Daily Star, March 26, 2005 Article not specified
  38. ^ Virtual Bangladesh
  39. ^ India, Pakistan, and the United States: Breaking with the Past By Shirin R. Tahir-Kheli ISBN 0-87609-199-0, 1997, Council on Foreign Relations. pp 37
  40. ^ Pakistan Defence Journal, 1977, Vol 2, p2-3
  41. ^ Bangladesh Liberation Armed Force, Liberation War Museum, Bangladesh.
  42. ^ India - Pakistan War, 1971; Introduction By Tom Cooper, with Khan Syed Shaiz Ali
  43. ^ Bangladesh: Out of War, a Nation Is Born
  44. ^ Indian Army after Independance by Maj KC Praval 1993 Lancer p317 [ISBN 1 897829 45 0]
  45. ^ Section 9. Situation in the Indian Subcontinent, 2. Bangladesh's international position - Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
  46. ^ Guess who's coming to dinner Naeem Bangali
  47. ^ The Simla Agreement 1972 - Story of Pakistan
  48. ^ Defencejournal, Redefining security imperatives by M Sharif - Article in Jang newspaper, General Niazi's Failure in High Command
  49. ^ Rummel, Rudolph J., "Statistics of Democide: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900", ISBN 3-8258-4010-7, Chapter 8, Table 8.2 Pakistan Genocide in Bangladesh Estimates, Sources, and Calcualtions: lowest estimate 2 million claimed by Pakistan (reported by Aziz, Qutubuddin. Blood and tears Karachi: United Press of Pakistan, 1974. pp. 74,226), all the other sources used by Rummel suggest a figure of between 8 and 10 million with one (Johnson, B. L. C. Bangladesh. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1975. pp. 73,75) that "could have been" 12 million.
  50. ^ Many of the eyewitness accounts of relations that were picked up by "Al Badr" forces describe them as Bengali men. The only survivor of the Rayerbazar killings describes the captors and killers of Bengali professionals as fellow Bengalis. See 37 Dilawar Hossain, account reproduced in ‘Ekattorer Ghatok-dalalera ke Kothay’ (Muktijuddha Chetona Bikash Kendro, Dhaka, 1989)
  51. ^ Asadullah Khan The loss continues to haunt us in The Daily Star (Bangladesh) December 14, 2005
  52. ^ DPA report Mass grave found in Bangladesh in The Chandigarh Tribune August 8, 1999
  53. ^ Sajit Gandhi The Tilt: The U.S. and the South Asian Crisis of 1971 National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 79 December 16, 2002
  54. ^ East Pakistan: Even the Skies Weep, Time Magazine, October 25, 1971.
  55. ^ U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Sitrep: Army Terror Campaign Continues in Dacca; Evidence Military Faces Some Difficulties Elsewhere, March 31, 1971, Confidential, 3 pp
  56. ^ Sen, Sumit (1999). “Stateless Refugees and the Right to Return: the Bihari Refugees of South Asia, Part 1”. International Journal of Refugee Law 11 (4): 625-645. http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/11/4/625.pdf. 
  57. ^ Gandhi, Sajit, ed. (December 16, 2002), The Tilt: The U.S. and the South Asian Crisis of 1971: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 79
  58. ^ U.S. Consulate in Dacca (March 27, 1971), Selective genocide, Cable (PDF)
  59. ^ Editorial The Jamaat Talks Backin The Bangladesh Observer December 30, 2005
  60. ^ Dr. N. Rabbee Remembering a Martyr Star weekend Magazine, The Daily Star December 16, 2005
  61. ^ Shalom, Stephen R., The Men Behind Yahya in the Indo-Pak War of 1971
  62. ^ http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/nov/pak-army.htm The Pakistan Army From 1965 to 1971 Analysis and reappraisal after the 1965 War] by Maj (Retd) Agha Humayun Amin

References[編集]

Further reading[編集]

  • Ayoob, Mohammed and Subrahmanyam, K., The Liberation War, S. Chand and Co. pvt Ltd. New Delhi, 1972.
  • Bhargava, G.S., Crush India or Pakistan's Death Wish, ISSD, New Delhi, 1972.
  • Bhattacharyya, S. K., Genocide in East Pakistan/Bangladesh: A Horror Story, A. Ghosh Publishers, 1988.
  • Brownmiller, Susan: Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape, Ballantine Books, 1993.
  • Choudhury, G.W., "Bangladesh: Why It Happened." International Affairs. (1973). 48(2): 242-249.
  • Choudhury, G.W., The Last Days of United Pakistan, Oxford University Press, 1994.
  • Govt. of Bangladesh, Documents of the war of Independence, Vol 01-16, Ministry of Information.
  • Kanjilal, Kalidas, The Perishing Humanity, Sahitya Loke, Calcutta, 1976
  • Johnson, Rob, 'A Region in Turmoil' (New York and London, 2005)
  • Malik, Amita, The Year of the Vulture, Orient Longmans, New Delhi, 1972.
  • Mascarenhas, Anthony, The Rape of Bangla Desh, Vikas Publications,1972.
  • Matinuddin, General Kamal, Tragedy of Errors: East Pakistan Crisis, 1968-1971, Wajidalis, Lahore, Pakistan, 1994.
  • Mookherjee, Nayanika, A Lot of History: Sexual Violence, Public Memories and the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971, D. Phil thesis in Social Anthropology, SOAS, University of London, 2002.
  • National Security Archive, The Tilt: the U.S. and the South Asian Crisis of 1971
  • Quereshi, Major General Hakeem Arshad, The 1971 Indo-Pak War, A Soldiers Narrative, Oxford University Press, 2002.
  • Rummel, R.J., Death By Government, Transaction Publishers, 1997.
  • Salik, Siddiq, Witness to Surrender, Oxford University Press, Karachi, Pakistan, 1977.
  • Sisson, Richard & Rose, Leo, War and secession: Pakistan, India, and the creation of Bangladesh, University of California Press (Berkeley), 1990.
  • Totten, Samuel et al, eds., Century of Genocide: Eyewitness Accounts and Critical Views, Garland Reference Library, 1997
  • US Department of State Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States: Nixon-Ford Administrations, vol. E-7, Documents on South Asia 1969-1972
  • Zaheer, Hasan: The separation of East Pakistan: The rise and realization of Bengali Muslim nationalism, Oxford University Press, 1994.

外部リンク[編集]

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