利用者:デウス・エクス・マキナ/sandbox

参考：w:North Yemen Civil War、北イエメン内戦

北イエメン内戦
エジプト軍の攻撃を撃退するイエメン王党派
時 1962–1970 場所 北イエメン 結果 共和派の勝利 サウジアラビアによる王党派への支援(1965年まで) エジプト軍は1967年までに撤退 王室を除く王党派の諸勢力は新たに成立した共和政府へ合流
衝突した勢力
イエメン王国  サウジアラビア 援助国:  ヨルダン  イギリス  イスラエル	イエメン・アラブ共和国 エジプト 援助国:  ソビエト連邦
指揮官
ムハンマド・アル＝バドル アル＝ハサン・ビン・ヤヒア アブドゥッラフマーン・ビン・ヤヒア ムハンマド・ビン・アル＝フサイン アブドゥッラー・ビン・アル＝ハサン ファイサル・ビン・アブドゥルアズィーズ	アブドゥッラー・アル＝サッラール ガマール・アブドゥル＝ナーセル アブドルハキーム・アーメル
戦力
準正規軍 20,000 (1965) 部族兵 200,000 (1965) 傭兵多数	正規軍 3,000 (1964) 正規軍 70,000 (1965)
被害者数
戦死 1,000	戦死 26,000
民間人死者 100,000–200,000

北イエメン内戦（きたイエメンないせん）とは、1962年から1970年の間、旧イエメン王国の王党派とイエメン・アラブ共和国の共和派が北イエメンで戦った内戦である。

概要

即位間もないイエメン王国第3代国王ムハンマド・アル＝バドルが1962年にアブドゥッラー・アル＝サッラール率いる共和派のクーデターによって廃位されると、国王はサウジアラビアに逃れて王党派を組織し、実権を掌握した共和派との8年間に及ぶ戦争状態に突入した。 王党派はヨルダン、サウジアラビアから軍事援助を、イギリスから秘密裏の支援を受ける一方で、共和派はエジプトとソビエト連邦に支援された。いずれの陣営にも外国の正規軍・傭兵が参加し、特にエジプトのナーセル大統領は7万人のエジプト兵と化学兵器を投入した。両陣営では和平を探る動きもあったものの、いずれも失敗に終わり戦争は泥沼化した。この戦争に気を取られていたエジプトは1967年6月に勃発した第三次中東戦争で敵対するイスラエルに惨敗したため、以後ナーセルはエジプト軍をイエメンから徐々に撤退させていった。

多くのエジプトの軍事評論家はイエメンにおけるエジプトの介入を米国のベトナム戦争に例えている。後にイスラエルの駐米大使となるマイケル・オレンは、イエメンでのエジプトの冒険的な軍事行動が悲惨な結果に終わったように、「今やベトナム戦争はアメリカにとってのイエメンになってしまった」と当時の心境を記している。

前史

イエメン

1948年に第2代イエメン国王に即位したイマーム、アフマド・ビン＝ヤフヤは、敵対する勢力から「悪魔のアフマド」として恐れられていた。1955年、イラクで訓練を受けたアフマド・サラヤ大佐が国王に反旗を翻し、首都タイズの王宮が反乱軍により包囲された。反乱軍はアフマド国王の退位を要求し、国王側も受け入れる姿勢を見せたものの、引き換えに彼の息子である皇太子ムハンマド・アル＝バドルを新国王として認めるよう要求した。サラヤ大佐は拒絶し、国王の異母兄弟で当時外務大臣を務めていたアブドゥッラーに王位につくよう求めた。新政府の樹立が進められる中、アフマド国王は王宮の財宝庫を解放して秘密裏に反乱兵の買収を始め、5日後には王宮を包囲する兵士は600人から僅か40人にまで減少した。機は熟したと判断した国王は悪魔の面と三日月刀を携えて反乱軍側の歩哨二人を切り殺し、サブマシンガンを奪った後に王宮近衛兵150人を引き連れて反乱軍へ総攻撃を仕掛けた。28時間後、反乱兵23名と近衛兵1名の死者を出した後、サラヤ大佐は降伏した。大佐は直ちに斬首刑に処され、反乱に加担したアブドゥッラーも後に処刑されたという。

ムハンマド・アル＝バドルと彼の従兄弟ハサン・ビン・フセイン

1958年5月、アル＝バドルは新たに成立したアラブ連合共和国へのイエメン王国の加入を目指し、エジプトのナーセル大統領との会談のためにシリアのダマスカスへ向かった。しかしながら、自らの王朝と権力を守ろうとしたアフマド国王が息子の行動を拒絶したため、イエメンは連合共和国と同盟のみを結び、合邦は見送られた。1959年になると、アフマド国王は関節炎などの数々の持病(一説では薬物中毒も含まれたという)を治療するためローマに向かった。国王の不在中、国内の部族長の間で抗争が勃発すると、政治を任されたアル＝バドルは評議会での議席や軍事費の増額、政治的地位の斡旋といった「改革」によって抗争を鎮めようとしたものの、部族長達の懐柔に失敗し抗争は激化する一方だった。アフマド国王が帰還すると、彼は抗争を起こした者達を「クリスチャンの手先」と見なし、徹底的に粉砕すると宣言した。国王の命令により、政府高官の殺害に関わったとして臣下の1人は斬首刑、15人が左腕と右足の切断刑に処された。国王は息子であるアル＝バドルを寛大すぎると叱ったが、以後イエメンでは報道管制が敷かれ、改革を求める声もしぼんだ。

1961年6月、アフマド国王は2月に起きた暗殺未遂事件の心労を癒すため、首都タイズを発って別荘へ向かった。既に国防・外務大臣となっていたアル＝バドルはこれを機に更に権力を拡大し、実質的な首相として振舞うようになった。一方で皇太子の地位にあったにも関わらず、アル＝バドルは未だにサナアのウラマーによる承認を受けていなかった。彼はナーセルと関わりを持っていたためウラマーの間では支持が広がらず、アフマド国王による度重なる承認要請も却下され続けていた。最終的に1962年9月18日、アフマド国王が死去した事でムハンマド・アル＝バドルが王位を継承した。新国王の最初の行動の一つは社会主義者、そしてナセル主義者としても知られたアブドゥッラー・サッラール大佐を王宮近衛隊の隊長に任命した事だった。

エジプト

イエメンの地図

ナーセル大統領は1957年以降イエメンの体制変革を狙うようになり、1962年1月にはイエメンの「解放」を目指す自由イエメン運動に活動拠点の提供や財政援助など様々な支援を行った。英国の外交官であったアンソニー・ヌッティングは、ナーセルが最終的にイエメンに遠征軍を派遣するに至った要因は複数あると自らの著書で指摘している。要因の一つとして、自らが主導したアラブ連合共和国がシリアの離脱によって1961年に実質的に崩壊し、ナーセルの権威が低下した事が挙げられている。イエメンで迅速かつ確実な勝利を上げる事ができれば、アラブ世界に対する彼の指導力を取り戻せると考えたのだろう。反帝国主義者として名を馳せていたナーセルが、当時未だイギリスの植民地下にあった南イエメン、特に戦略的要衝であるアデンに注目していた事も要因の一つとされている。

エジプトのジャーナリストであるモハメド・ヘイカルは、イエメンでのクーデターの進め方に関して議論するためにナーセルが雇った相談役だった。ヘイカルはサッラール大佐の革命軍にはエジプト遠征軍を受け入れるだけの能力が無いと主張し、スペイン内戦における国際旅団のように、中東全体からアラブ民族主義者を集めて義勇兵を組織し、イエメンに送り込んで共和派と共闘させるべきだと考えていた。だが、アラブ民族主義の守護者を任じていたナーセルはヘイカルの意見を拒絶した。彼は精強なエジプト軍部隊と爆撃機があれば、イエメンでの共和派によるクーデターを成功に導けると確信していた。

ナーセルによる派兵の決断は大きく分けて6つの要因によるものだと考えられている。1つ目は、アルジェリア戦争(1954-1962)においてエジプトが支援したアルジェリア民族解放戦線(FLN)側が勝利した事により、ナーセルが自信を持った事。2つ目に、前述した1961年のシリアの離脱によるアラブ連合共和国の崩壊。3つ目として、アルジェリアにおけるFLNの支援や、ナーセルの影響を受けた軍部によりイラク王政が打倒され、ソ連に対抗する反共同盟としてイギリスが結成した中央条約機構が実質的に崩壊した事に起因する英仏との対立を優位に進めるため。4つ目に、帝国主義との対決をエジプトの天命と考えていたナーセルの政治的理念。5つ目として、スエズ運河からバブ・エル・マンデブ海峡に至るまでの紅海の支配権をエジプトが獲得するため。そして6つ目に、シリアの離脱を影で支援したとナーセルが見なしていたサウード家に対する報復のため、である。

戦争の推移

クーデター

計画段階

作家ダナ・アダムス・シュミットとサッラール大統領 (1967年)

アフマド前国王の死後、イエメン王国の首都サナアでは少なくとも4つの勢力がクーデターを計画していた。一つはイエメン陸軍のアリー・アブドゥル・アル＝モフニー中尉によるものだった。サッラール大佐は当初独自にクーデターを実行しようとしていたが、前国王に首長とその息子を処刑され、イエメン王家を憎んでいたハシッド部族連合と手を結ぶ事を決め、両者は共同して計画を進める事となった。また国王となるのに必要なイマーム位を有してはいないものの、アル＝バドルと同じく前国王の血を継ぐ王子達も現体制の打倒を狙っていた。この4つの勢力の計画について知っていたのはエジプトの臨時代理大使であったアブドゥル・ワハドと、当事者である国王アル＝バドルのみであった。アフマド前国王が崩御した直後、当時ロンドンに駐在していた国王派のアフマド・アル＝シャミ大使は、親エジプト派の将校達が不穏な動きを見せているため、サナアで行われる前国王の葬式には参加しないように促す電報をアル＝バドルへ送った。だがアル＝バドルの秘書官は解読が困難だとして電報の内容を伝える事を拒んだため、アル＝バドルはそのまま葬式に参列してしまった。国王自身は何千という取り巻きを連れていた為無事だったものの、彼が電報の内容を知ったのはその後の事であった。

クーデターの決行予定日が近づくと、情報機関からクーデターに関する情報を得ていたエジプトのワハド大使は、サッラールやモフニーなどの将校達が革命を起こそうとしている旨を国王アル＝バドルに警告した。ワハド大使の目的は、仮にクーデターが失敗に終わった場合に備えて自身とエジプトの立場を守る一方で、クーデターを計画している者達、特にサッラール大佐とモフニー中尉に対し速やかに行動に移るよう促す事だった。サッラールはワハドの助言を受けてすぐに動き、宗教指導者達から挙兵に関する大義名分を得る事に成功した。その後モフニー中尉の下に向かったワハド大使は、クーデターの計画は既にアル＝バドル側に露見しているため、他の将校達が逮捕される前に今すぐクーデターを決行すべきだと伝えた。大使はモフニーに対し、彼がサナアのラジオ局や空港といった主要施設を三日以内に占拠できれば、欧州諸国は新体制を速やかに承認するだろうと語ったという。

クーデターの準備は整ったと判断したサッラール大佐は、自身の影響下にあったサナアの軍学校に対し、全武器庫を解放してサッラールを支持する士官達に武器を支給するようにとの命令を発した。1962年9月25日夕刻、サッラールはイエメンの民主化・共和制導入を求める民族運動の指導者達や、1955年のアフマド前国王への反乱事件に参加ないし共鳴していた士官達を集め、王宮への砲撃が開始され次第クーデターを決行する事を伝えた。主要な攻撃・占拠目標となったのは国王アル＝バドルが居住するアル・バシャー宮殿、政府高官を迎えるアル・ウスル宮殿、ラジオ局、電話交換局、そして情報・治安機関を統括する中央安全司令部であった。

実行

午後10時30分、宮殿付近で次第に高まる戦車の駆動音を耳にした国王アル＝バドルは、遂にサッラール大佐がクーデターを仕掛けてきた事を知った。午後11時45分には宮殿への砲撃が開始され、国王は機関銃を手に反撃を始めた。一方モフニー中尉はサッラールを司令部に招き、協力して革命に参加するよう要請した。彼は大統領の地位と引き換えに応じると述べ、モフニーはその条件を受け入れた。クーデターは戦車13両、装甲車6両などを主力として進められ、国王派は軍学校を司令部として抵抗したものの、戦力面での劣勢は明らかだった。革命軍の将校率いる戦車隊がアル・バシャー宮殿を包囲すると、彼らは拡声器を用いて王宮近衛兵達に国王を見限るよう呼びかけると共に、国王アル＝バドルに対して身の安全の保証及び国外追放と引き換えに投降するよう要求した。近衛兵達が投降の呼びかけを拒絶して応戦を始めると、革命軍は当初の計画通り戦車隊と砲兵による砲撃を開始した。

翌朝、近衛兵達の降伏によって宮殿での戦闘は終結した。ラジオ局は国王派の将校の死により抵抗勢力が瓦解した事で最も早く陥落し、武器庫も多くがサッラール大佐の呼びかけに応じて速やかに革命軍の制圧下に入った。電話交換局は何の抵抗も受けずに革命側が占拠した。同じく革命軍が占拠したアル・ウスル宮殿では、「新たなイエメンのイマームを迎えるため」として外交官や政府高官が拘束された。9月26日の昼までにはサナアの全ての主要拠点が制圧され、ラジオ局は新たに権力を掌握した革命政府によって国王ムハンマド・アル＝バドルは廃位されたと放送した。革命政府は旧首都タイズやフダイダといった国内の重要拠点に軍を派遣し、港や基地などの軍事拠点を次々と制圧していった。

クーデター後

アブドゥッラー・サッラール(中央)とクーデターの指導者達 (1962年10月)

陥落前に部下達と共に宮殿を脱出していたアル＝バドルは、戒厳令下のサナアを目立たぬように徒歩で移動し、郊外の村に身を潜めた。一方サッラールは、同じ革命軍の同志でありながらナセル主義に批判的であった知識階級出身のアル・バイダニと対立しつつあった。9月28日になると、ラジオ局はアル＝バドルは死亡したと発表した。サッラールは国内の部族長達を集め、「腐敗しきった君主制が一千年間に亘ってこの国を支配してきた事は、全ての同胞たるアラブ人と人類にとって耐え難き恥であった。革命が成功した今、君主制を復活させようと企む者は誰であれアッラーと人類にとっての敵となる」と宣言した。サッラールの下には既に国王アル＝バドルが未だ生きており、サウジアラビアへ亡命しようとしている事が伝わっていた。

革命が成功したとの報を受けたエジプトは、直ちにイエメン革命評議会の下にアリー・アブドゥル・ハミード将軍を派遣して情報を集めさせ、革命政府の要請に応じてサッラールの身の安全を守る特殊部隊を派遣した。部隊がイエメンのフダイダに到着したのは要請を受けてから僅か一週間後の10月5日であったという。ハミード将軍がエジプトを去ってから15日後、アル＝バドルはサウジアラビアに自らの生存を伝える特使を派遣し、後に自身もイエメン王国北部からアル・コバールを経由して同国へ亡命した。

外交的解決の試み

クーデターの後、ナセル主義の拡大を恐れていたサウジアラビアはイエメンとの国境付近に軍隊を展開し、ヨルダン王国もまたアル＝バドルの叔父であったハッサン王子と協議するために陸軍参謀長を派遣した。10月2日から8日までの間、王党派を支援するため武器と軍事物資を載せた貨物飛行機4機がサウジから飛び立ったものの、いずれもアスワンで発見され貨物は押収された。クーデターに対する国際社会の反応は割れ、西ドイツ、イギリス、アメリカ合衆国、ヨルダン大使は亡命したイマームと王党派を支持したのに対し、エジプト、イタリア、ユーゴスラビア大使は共和派による”革命”を支持すると表明した。ソビエト連邦は共和国側を国家承認した最初の国であった。ソ連の最高指導者であったニキータ・フルシチョフはサッラールに対し、「イエメンに対するあらゆる敵対行為はソ連に対する同様の行為と見なされる」と伝え、共和派を強力に支援する意向を明確にした。

アメリカ合衆国が特に懸念していたのは、イエメンでの紛争が中東全体に拡散する事であった。アメリカのジョン・F・ケネディ大統領はエジプトのナーセル大統領、サウジアラビアのファイサル皇太子、ヨルダンの国王フセイン1世、そしてサッラールに対して速やかにある提案を行った。その提案とは、サウジアラビアとヨルダンがイエメンのイマームへの支援を停止するのと引き換えに、ナーセルがイエメンから部隊を撤退させるというものであった。ナーセルは提案に同意したが、条件としてヨルダンとサウジアラビアによる「国境地帯におけるあらゆる敵対的行動の中止」を求めた。ファイサルとフセイン1世は、この計画は合衆国が「反乱勢力」によるクーデターを事実上承認するものだとして拒絶した。サウジアラビアとヨルダンは、イマームが未だイエメンにおける統治権を保持している以上、アメリカがサッラール政権を国家として認定するのは時期尚早であると主張した。また両国はエジプトが部隊を撤退させると約束した事に異議を唱え、サウジアラビアはナーセルの狙いは油田であり、イエメンをアラビア半島全域で反乱を引き起こす前哨基地として活用しようと目論んでいるとする自説を展開した。ヨルダンのフセイン1世もまた、ナーセルの目的はサウジアラビアの油田であり、イエメンの次はサウジが狙われるだろうと主張した。

新政権の大統領となったサッラールは、「もしアメリカがイエメン・アラブ共和国を承認しないのであれば、我が国もアメリカを国家として認めないだろう」と国内外に宣言した。タイズのアメリカ合衆国臨時代理大使であったロバート・ストゥーキーは、共和派政権は一部の国境地帯を除いて国家全土を完全に掌握していると本国に報告したが、一方でイギリス政府は地方部族のイマームに対する忠誠心の高さを指摘し、王党派の勢力を無視するべきではないと主張した。ケネディ大統領が1962年10月25日にサウジアラビアのファイサル皇太子に送り、翌年の1月まで機密指定扱いを受けていた手紙の中では、「合衆国はサウジアラビアの主権を守るためにあらゆる支援を惜しまない」と述べられていた。その文言の通り、アメリカは二度に渡って米空軍によるパフォーマンスをサウジアラビアで行った。一回目ではリヤドとジッダの上空に6機のF-100を含む複数の戦闘機が姿を現し、航空ショーを行った。二回目はパキスタンのカラチ基地への訪問を終えてパリ近郊の基地へ帰還する途中だったジェット推進爆撃機2機、および同じくジェット推進製の大型輸送機1機がリヤドにて同様のパフォーマンスを展開した。

サッラールはまた、イエメン新政権はイギリスがアデンを保護領として扱う事を認めた1934年の条約を含む「あらゆる国際法上の責務を厳格に尊重する」方針をとる事を国際社会に向けて表明した。ナーセルは18000人に及ぶエジプト軍部隊の「漸進的な撤退の開始」を約束し、「この決定によってサウジとヨルダンも国境地帯から軍を撤退させる義務を負う」と述べたものの、同じくイエメンに派遣していたエジプト人技術者と顧問団の引き上げは否定した。これを受け、アメリカ合衆国は12月19日にイエメン・アラブ共和国を国家承認した34番目の国となった。その翌日、国際連合もまた合衆国に続いて新政権の承認に踏み切った。国連は共和派をイエメンにおける唯一の合法政権であると見なし、王党派の勢力を完全に無視する方針を取り続けた。

一方、南アラビア地域とアデン基地を自らの勢力圏としていたイギリスにとって、エジプトの侵攻は自国の権益に対する大きな脅威であった。仮に共和派の承認に踏み切れば、イギリスが先立って南アラビア連邦の首長達と締結した条約に問題が発生する事は明らかであった。それを見越したサウジアラビアは、イギリスに王党派側につくよう強く働きかけていた。一方、イギリス外務省の中には共和派を承認する事でエデンの安全を保障できると考える者もいた。しかしながら、最終的にイギリスは共和派の承認を見送った。イラン、トルコ、そして西欧諸国の大半も同様の立場をとった。共和派政権は西ドイツ、イタリア、カナダ、オーストラリア、サウジとヨルダンを除くアラブ諸国、エチオピア、そして東側諸国全体から国家として承認された。

アメリカ合衆国による新政権の承認から一週間後、サッラールは軍事パレードを行い、共和国が「サウジアラビアの王宮」を攻撃可能なミサイル兵器を保有している事を誇示した。また1963年1月初旬にはエジプト軍がイエメンとの国境付近にあるサウジアラビアの都市ナジュラーンを爆撃した。これらの挑発行為を防ぐため、アメリカは1月15日に再びジッダで米海軍の駆逐艦一隻も参加した空軍によるパフォーマンスを行い、両国を強く牽制した。報告によれば、合衆国はナジュラーンにアメリカ軍の対空部隊とレーダー装置を設置する事をサウジに約束したとされる。それに加え、外交官であったラルフ・バンチをイエメンに派遣し、サッラールとエジプト軍の陸軍元帥アブドルハキーム・アーメルとの会談を実現させた。3月6日にはバンチは今度はカイロへ飛んでナーセルと接触し、サウジが王党派への支援を中止すればエジプト軍をイエメンから撤退させるとの言質を引き出す事に成功した。

ハードサーフェス作戦

バンチが国連事務総長のウ・タントにイエメン情勢を報告していた時、アメリカ合衆国国務省は事態打開を図るためエルスワース・バンカー大使に支援を要請した。彼の任務は、国家安全保障会議のマクジョージ・バンディとロバート・ウィリアム・コウマーによって考案されたある構想を実現させる事だった。「ハードサーフェス作戦」として知られるこの構想は、アメリカはサウジが王党派を支援するのを中止すればサウジの主権を守る(あるいはそう表明する)と約束し、引き換えにナーセルはエジプト軍を北イエメンから撤退させるというものであった。この作戦は「僅か八機の航空機」を実行部隊として想定していた。

バンカー大使は1963年3月6日にサウジの首都リヤドに到着して交渉に入ったものの、当初ファイサル皇太子は彼の提案に強い拒否反応を示した。バンカーの提案にはいまだ民主的とは言い難いサウジの政治改革を求める事も含まれていたためである。初期のハードサーフェス作戦構想ではアメリカの航空機がサウジの領空を侵犯するあらゆる機体を「攻撃し破壊する」とされていたが、後に「サウジは攻撃を受けた際に自国を防衛する権利を有する」との文言に変更された。ナーセル主義の拡大を恐れるファイサル皇太子に対してバンカーはあくまで作戦の実行に拘り、サウジが王党派への支援を止めれば合衆国はナーセルに対して撤兵を強力に要求できるようになると強く主張した。最終的にファイサルはバンカーの提案を受け入れ、彼は次にバンチに対して繰り返し自らの発言を守ると宣言していたエジプト大統領ナーセルと会談するべくベイルートに向かった。

バンチとバンカーらの活動はイエメン情勢を国際的に監視する活動の契機となり、最終的に国際連合イエメン監視団として結実した。コンゴ国連軍の指揮官の一人であったスウェーデンのカール・フォン・ホルン少将率いる同監視団の任務は以下の2項目が想定されていた。すなわち、(1)サウジアラビア＝イエメン間の国境から互いに20km離れた地域を非武装地帯と設定し、あらゆる軍事兵器の持ち込みを禁止する事、そして(2)同地帯に国連監視団が駐留し、特にサウジによる王党派への支援活動を報告・阻止する事である。

4月30日、フォン・ホルン少将は必要な兵力を見積もる為に現地へ派遣され、その数日後にカイロでエジプトのアーメル元帥と会談した。その結果、エジプトはイエメンから軍を撤退させる意図は全くない事が判明した。更に数日後、サウジの外務副大臣と話し合った彼は、サウジ軍の国境からの撤退後に治安部隊を引き上げるとしているエジプトの提案にはサウジは応じられない事を伝えられた。サウジアラビアは既に、ナーセルがシリアとイラクとの統一国家を維持するために形振り構わない行動に出る事を恐れ、イエメンの王党派に対する支援を減少させていた。この時点でのエジプトの戦費は一日当たり100万ドルに及び、死傷者も5000人近く上っていた。しかし部隊を撤退させるとの約束にも関わらず、エジプトは未だ新生イエメン共和国陸軍の「訓練の為」派遣されている顧問団については引き上げを否定していた。

6月、フォン・ホルンは1)サウジの王党派に対する支援の完全停止、2)イエメン＝サウジアラビア間の国境から25マイルの地域における非武装地帯の設定、3)エジプト軍の段階的撤退の監視という3つの任務 を達成するべくサナアへ向かったが、いずれも失敗に終わった。9月になるとフォン・ホルンはタントに辞職の意を伝え、この任務はエジプトとサウジアラビア双方の協力を得られなければ継続不可能との見方を示した。その間にもエジプト軍の部隊は増加の一途を辿り、翌年1月の終わりにはファイサル皇太子との交渉決裂により「ハードサーフェス部隊」は撤退に追い込まれた。1964年9月4日、国連は停戦監視任務が失敗したと認め、イエメン情勢に関するあらゆる活動の停止を余儀なくされた。

エジプト軍の攻勢

The Ramadan (straight) and Haradh (dotted) offensives

エジプト軍の参謀本部はイエメンにおける戦争計画を三つの段階に分けて立案した。最初の段階では戦闘爆撃機から成る3個航空団が主力となり、王党派の沿岸拠点及びサウジのナジュラーン、ジーザーンに対して機銃掃射及び爆撃を加える。この空爆は大規模な陸上兵力を擁していないエジプト側にとって、サナア周辺の幹線道路及び戦略上重要な拠点を確保する第二段階を遂行する上で必要不可欠であった。第二段階における最大の攻撃作戦が1963年5月から1964年2月まで続けられたラマダーン攻勢で、サナアから北部の都市サード、そして東部のマアリブに至るまでの進軍経路の確保が目的とされた。これら一連のエジプト側の作戦が成功した事で王党派の残存勢力は山岳部に逃れ、以後共和派に対してゲリラ戦を繰り返すようになった。作戦の最終段階では王党派についた部族と講和し、共和国政府への帰順を呼びかけるべく必要な支出を行う事、つまりは人道的支援という名目で部族長達に多額の賄賂を贈る事とされた。

Ramadan offensive

戦争初期、マアリブ郊外で王党派に鹵獲された共和派のヘリコプター

ラマダーン攻勢は1963年2月、アーメルとサーダートがサナアに到着した時点をもって開始された。アーメルはカイロの参謀本部に対して当時2万人を数えたイエメン派遣軍を更に倍増するよう要請し、早くも2月初旬の内には増員5千名が到着した。2月18日になると戦車15両・装甲車20両等から成る特殊部隊がサナアを出発し、サードを目指して北上を開始した。数日後、今度は別の部隊が南東マアリブを目指し出征した。こうした作戦行動はサウジ領と接するルブアルハリ砂漠で行われたため、補給手段は空輸に限定された。

The Ramadan offensive began in February 1963 when Amer and Sadat arrived in San'a. Amer asked Cairo to double the 20,000 men in Yemen, and in early February the first 5,000 of the reinforcement arrived. On February 18 a task force of fifteen tanks, twenty armored cars, eighteen trucks and numerous jeeps took off from San'a' moving northwards, heading for Sadah. More garrison troops followed. A few days later another task force, spearheaded by 350 men in tanks and armored cars, struck out from Sadah southeastwards toward Marib. The maneuvered into the Rub al-Khali desert, perhaps well into Saudi territory, and there they were built up by an airlift. Then they headed westwards. On February 25 they occupied Marib and on March 7 they took Harib. A royalist force of 1,500 men ordered down from Najran failed to stop them on their way out from Sadah. The royalist commander at Harib fled to Beihan, on the British-protected side of the border. In the battle of El Argoup, 25 miles southeast of San'a, 500 royalists under Prince Abdullah's command attacked an Egyptian position on top of a sheer-sided hill that was fortified with six Soviet T-54 tanks, a dozen armored cars and entrenched machine guns. The royalists advanced in a thin skirmish line and were plastered by artillery, mortars and strafing planes. They replied with rifles, one mortar with 20 rounds, and a bazooka with four rounds. The battle lasted a week and cost the Egyptians three tanks, seven armored cars and 160 dead. The Egyptians were now in positions from which they could hope to interdict the royalist movement of supplies in the mountains north and east of San'a'.

In the beginning of April the royalists held a conference with Faisal in Riyadh. They decided to adopt new tactics, including attempts to get supplies around the positions now held by the Egyptians by using camels instead of trucks to cross the mountains to reach the positions east of San'a. Camel caravans from Beihan would swing into the Rub al-Khali and enter Yemen north of Marib. It was also decided that the royalists must now strengthen their operations west of the mountains with three "armies". By the end of April, they began to recover and claimed to have regained some of the positions the Egyptians had taken in the Jawf, particularly the small but strategic towns of Barat and Safra, both in the mountains between Sadah and the Jawf, and were able to move freely in the eastern Khabt desert. In the Jawf they claimed to have cleaned up all Egyptian strong-points except Hazm, and in the west the town of Batanah.

Haradh offensive

On June 12, Egyptian infantry numbering at about 4,000, reinforced by the republican army and mercenaries from the Aden protectorate invaded the town of Beit Adaqah, about thirty miles west of San'a, where Prince Abdullah held a front extending from the Hodeida road, through Kawakaban province, to southern Hajjah. In two days, the attackers advanced about twelve miles, before being repelled by a counter-attack. The royalists admitted about 250 casualties. Next, the Egyptians attacked Sudah, about 100 miles north-west of San'a. They used the unpopularity of the local royalist commander to bribe several local sheiks and occupied the town unopposed. After a month, the sheiks sent delegations to al-Badr soliciting pardons and asking for guns and money with which to fight the Egyptians. Al-Badr sent new forces and managed to regain the surroundings of Sudah, though not the town itself.

A Soviet-manufactured armored car, captured by royalist guerrillas from the Egyptians near Haradh

On August 15, the Egyptians launched an offensive from their major north-western base in Haradh. They had 1,000 troops and about 2,000 republicans. The plan, as interpreted by British intelligence, seemed to have been to cut the thirty-mile track southward through the mountains from the Saudi border at Khoubah to al-Badr's headquarters in the Qara mountains near Washa, and then to split into two task forces, one moving east through Washa to the headquarters and the other north-eastwards along the track to the Saudi border below the Razih mountains. The Egyptians began their move on Saturday morning, moving along the Haradh and Tashar ravines. On Saturday and Sunday afternoons they were caught in heavy rain and their vehicles, including twenty tanks and about forty armored cars sank axle deep into the mud. The defenders left them alone until Monday at dawn. Al-Badr left his headquarters at three that morning with 1,000 men to direct a counterattack in the Tashar ravine, while Abdullah Hussein attacked in the Haradh ravine.

Meanwhile, the Egyptians had planned a coordinated drive from Sadah to the southwest, below the Razih mountains, hoping to link up with the force coming from Haradh. They were counting on a local sheik, whose forces were to supposed to join 250 Egyptian parachutists. The sheik failed to deliver, and the parachutists made their way back to Sadah, suffering losses from snipers on the way. Al-Badr had sent radio messages and summonses by runner in all directions calling for reinforcement. He asked reserve forces training in the Jawf to arrive in trucks mounting 55- and 57-millimeter cannon and 81 millimeter mortars and heavy machine guns. They arrived within forty-eight hours, in time to face the attackers. They outflanked the Egyptian columns, still stuck in mud in the ravines. They later announced they had knocked out ten of the Egyptian tanks and about half of their armored cars, and claimed to have shot down an Ilyushin bomber. The royalists also carried out two supporting movements. One was a raid on Jihana, in which several staff officers were killed. The second was an attempt, involving British advisors and French and Belgian mercenaries from Katanga, to bombard San'a from a nearby mountain peak. Other diversionary operations included raids on Egyptian aircraft and tanks at the south airport of San'a and a mortar at the Egyptian and republican residence in a suburb of Taiz. Although the Egyptians managed to drive al-Badr out of his headquarters to a cave on Jabal Shedah, they could not close the Saudi border. They declared victory on the radio and on the press, but were obliged to agree to a ceasefire on the upcoming Erkwit conference on November 2.

Alexandria summit and Erkwit ceasefire

In September, 1964, Nasser and Faisal met in the Arab summit in Alexandria. By that time Egypt had 40,000 troops in Yemen and had suffered an estimated 10,000 casualties. In their official communiqué the two leaders promised to 1) cooperate fully to solve the existing differences between the various factions in Yemen, 2) work together in preventing armed clashes in Yemen, and 3) reach a solution by peaceful agreement. The communiqué was widely hailed in the Arab world, and Washington called it a "statesmanlike action" and a "major step toward eventual peaceful settlement of the long civil war." Nasser and Faisal warmly embraced at Alexandria's airport and called each other "brother". Faisal said he was leaving Egypt "with my heart brimming with love for President Nasser."

On November 2, at a secret conference in Erkwit, Sudan, the royalists and republicans declared a ceasefire effective at 1:00 PM on Monday, November 8. Tribesmen of both sides celebrated the decision until that day, and for two days after it went into effect, they fraternized at several places. On November 2 and 3, nine royalists and nine republicans, with a Saudi and an Egyptian observer, worked out the terms. A conference of 168 tribal leaders was planned for November 23. For the royalists, the conference was to become an embryo national assembly that would name a provisional national executive of two royalists, two republicans and one neutral, to administer the country provisionally and to plan a plebiscite. Until that plebiscite, which would decide whether Yemen would be a monarchy or a republic, both Sallal and al-Badr were to step aside. At the end of the two days the Egyptians resumed their bombing of royalist positions. The conference planned for November 23 was postponed to the 30th, then indefinitely. The republicans blamed the royalists for not arriving, while the royalists blamed the Egyptian bombings.

Royalist offensive

The camp used by royalist forces at Hanjar, in north-eastern Yemen

Between December 1964 and February 1965 the royalists discerned four Egyptian attempts to drive directly into the Razih mountains. The intensity of these thrusts gradually diminished, and it was estimated that the Egyptians lost 1,000 men killed, wounded and taken prisoner. Meanwhile, the royalists were building up an offensive. The Egyptian line of communications went from San'a to Amran, then Khairath, where it branched off north-eastwards to Harf. From Harf it turned due south to Farah, and then South-eastwards to Humaidat, Mutamah and Hazm. From Hazm it led south-eastwards to Marib and Harib. A military convoy went over this route twice a month. Since the royalists had closed the direct route across the mountains from San'a to Marib, the Egyptians had no other way.

The royalists under the command of Prince Mohamed's objective was to cut the Egyptians' line and force them to withdraw. They intended to take over the garrisons along this line and establish positions from which they could interdict the Egyptian movement. They had prepared the attack with the help of the Nahm tribe, who tricked the Egyptians into believing that they were their allies and would take care of the mountain pass known as Wadi Humaidat themselves. The royalist deal was that the Nahm would be entitled to loot the ambushed Egyptians. The Egyptians may have suspected something was up, as they sent a reconnaissance aircraft over the area a day before the attack. The royalists thus occupied two mountains known as Asfar and Ahmar and installed 75-mm guns and mortars overlooking the wadi. On April 15, the day after the last Egyptian convoy went through, the royalists launched a surprise attack. Both forces numbered at only a couple of thousands. The guns positioned on Asfar and Ahmar opened fire, and then the Nahm came out from behind the rocks. Finally, Prince Mohamed's troops followed. This time, the royalists' operation was fully coordinated by radio. Some of the Egyptians surrendered without resistance, others fled to Harah 800 yards to the north. Both sides brought reinforcements and the battle shifted between Harf and Hazm.

Meanwhile, Prince Abdullah bin Hassan began to raid Egyptian positions north-east of San'a at Urush, Prince Mohamed bin Mohsin was attacking the Egyptians with 500 men west of Humaidat, Prince Hassan struck out from near Sadah and Prince Hassan bin Hussein moved from Jumaat, west of Sadah, to within mortar-firing distance of the Egyptian airfield west of Sadah. Fifty Egyptians surrendered at Mutanah, near Humaidat. They were eventually allowed to evacuate to San'a with their arms. Mohamed's policy was to keep officers as prisoners for exchange, and to allow soldiers to go in return for their arms. Three to five thousand Egyptian troops in garrisons on the eastern slopes of the mountains and in the desert now had to be supplied entirely by air.

Stalemate

Egyptian bomb damage in a village near Marib

The royalist radio tried to widen the split in republican ranks by promising amnesty to all non-royalists once the Egyptians were withdrawn. Al-Badr also promised a new form of government: "a constitutionally democratic system" ruled by a "national assembly elected by the people of Yemen". At Sallal's request, Nasser provided him with ammunition and troop reinforcements by transport plane from Cairo. By August, the royalists had seven "armies", each varying in strength between 3,000 and 10,000 men, with a total somewhere between 40,000 and 60,000. There were also five or six times as many armed royal tribesmen, and the regular force under Prince Mohamed. In early June they moved into Sirwah in eastern Yemen. On June 14 they entered Qaflan and on July 16 they occupied Marib. According to official Egyptian army figures, they had 15,194 killed. The war was costing Egypt $500,000 a day. The royalists had lost an estimated 40,000 dead. In late August, Nasser decided to get the Soviets more involved in the conflict. He convinced them to cancel a $500 million debt he had incurred and provide military aid to the republicans. In early May, Sallal fired his Premier, General Hassan Amri, and appointed Ahmed Noman in his place. Noman was considered a moderate who believed in compromise. He had resigned as president of the republican Consultative Council in December in protest against Sallal's "failure to fulfill the people's aspirations". Noman's first act was to name a new 15-man Cabinet, maintaining an even balance between Yemen's two main tribal groupings, the mountain Zaidi Shias, who were mostly royalist, and the Shafi'i Sunnis, who were mostly republican.

Nasser's "long-breath" strategy

Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser (standing to the left) welcomed by Yemeni crowds on his visit to Sana'a, April 1964. In front of Nasser and giving a salute is Yemeni President al-Sallal.

Egypt had run up a foreign debt of nearly $3 billion, and the gap between exports and imports had widened to a record $500 million for 1965. On Victory Day in Port Said, Nasser conceded that "We are facing difficulties. We must all work harder and make sacrifices. I have no magic button that I can push to produce the things you want". Premier Zakaria Mohieddin raised Egypt's income tax, added a "defense tax" on all sales, and boosted tariffs on nonessential imports. He also hiked the cost of luxury goods 25% and set low price ceilings on most foodstuffs. He sent 400 plainclothesmen to Cairo's to arrest 150 shopkeepers for price violations. In March 1966, the Egyptian forces, now numbering almost 60,000, launched their biggest offensive. The royalists counterattacked but the stalemate resumed. Egyptian-supported groups executed sabotage bombings in Saudi Arabia.

In a speech on May Day, 1966, Nasser said the war was entering a new phase. He launched what he called a "long-breath strategy." The plan was to pare the army from 70,000 men to 40,000, withdraw from exposed positions in eastern and northern Yemen, and tighten the hold on particular parts of Yemen: the Red Sea coastline; a northern boundary that takes in the well-fortified town of Hajja and San'a; and the border with the South Arabian Federation, which was to become independent in 1968. Nasser insisted that attacks on Najran, Qizan and other "bases of aggression" would continue, arguing that "these were originally Yemeni towns, which the Saudis usurped in 1930".

Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East and South Asia, flew in for talks with both Faisal and Nasser. In Alexandria, Nasser refused to pull out his troops, despite the risk of losing part or all of a new $150 million US food-distribution program, and another $100 million worth of industrial-development aid. Later that month, Alexei Kosygin counseled Nasser not to risk a stoppage of the U.S. Food for Peace program because Russia could not afford to pay the bill. The Russians were also willing to aid Nasser with arms and equipment in Yemen, but feared that a widening of the conflict to Saudi Arabia would lead to a "hot war" confrontation in the Middle East. Nasser was warned that "the Soviet Union would be displeased to see an attack on Saudi Arabia."

In October, Sallal's palace in San'a was attacked with a bazooka, and insurgents began targeting an Egyptian army camp outside the city and setting fire to Egyptian installations, killing a reported 70 Egyptian troops. Sallal arrested about 140 suspects, including Mohamed Ruwainy, the ex-Minister for Tribal Affairs, and Colonel Hadi Issa, former deputy chief of staff of the armed forces. Sallal accused Ruwainy and Issa of organizing a "subversive network seeking to plunge the country into terrorism and panic" and planning a campaign of assassination, financed by Saudi Arabia, Britain, Israel and the US. Ruwainy, Issa and five others were executed, while eight others received prison sentences ranging from five years to life. In February, 1967, Nasser vowed to "stay in Yemen 20 years if necessary", while Prince Hussein bin Ahmed said "We are prepared to fight for 50 years to keep Nasser out, just as we did the Ottoman Turks." Tunisia broke diplomatic relations with the republic, saying that the Sallal government no longer has power to govern the country. Sallal's chargé d'affaires in Czechoslovakia flew to Beirut and announced that he was on his way to offer his services to the royalists. Nasser said that "As the situation now stands, Arab summits are finished forever."

Chemical warfare

The International Red Cross hospital at Uqd

The first use of gas took place on June 8, 1963 against Kawma, a village of about 100 inhabitants in northern Yemen, killing about seven people and damaging the eyes and lungs of twenty-five others. This incident is considered to have been experimental, and the bombs were described as "home-made, amateurish and relatively ineffective". The Egyptian authorities suggested that the reported incidents were probably caused by napalm, not gas. The Israeli Foreign Minister, Golda Meir, suggested in an interview that Nasser would not hesitate to use gas against Israel as well. There were no reports of gas during 1964, and only a few were reported in 1965. The reports grew more frequent in late 1966. On December 11, 1966, fifteen gas bombs killed two people and injured thirty-five. On January 5, 1967, the biggest gas attack came against the village of Kitaf, causing 270 casualties, including 140 fatalities. The target may have been Prince Hassan bin Yahya, who had installed his headquarters nearby. The Egyptian government denied using poison gas, and alleged that Britain and the US were using the reports as psychological warfare against Egypt. On February 12, 1967, it said it would welcome a UN investigation. On March 1, U Thant said he was "powerless" to deal with the matter.

On May 10, the twin villages of Gahar and Gadafa in Wadi Hirran, where Prince Mohamed bin Mohsin was in command, were gas bombed, killing at least seventy-five. The Red Cross was alerted and on June 2, it issued a statement in Geneva expressing concern. The Institute of Forensic Medicine at the University of Berne made a statement, based on a Red Cross report, that the gas was likely to have been halogenous derivatives - phosgene, mustard gas, lewisite, chloride or cyanogen bromide. The gas attacks stopped for three weeks after the Six-Day War of June, but resumed on July, against all parts of royalist Yemen. Casualty estimates vary, and an assumption, considered conservative, is that the mustard and phosgene-filled aerial bombs caused approximately 1,500 fatalities and 1,500 injuries.

Egyptian withdrawal

Situation in North Yemen 1967 between Republicans (black) and Zaidi Royalists (red)

By 1967, Egyptian forces relied exclusively on defending a triangle linking Hodeida, Taiz and San'a, while striking southern Saudi Arabia and North Yemen with air sorties. In August, 1967, in order to make up for the 15,000 Egyptian killed, captured or missing, as a result of the Six-Day War, Nasser recalled 15,000 of his troops from Yemen. Egypt imposed higher taxes on its middle and upper classes, raised workers' compulsory monthly savings by 50%, reduced overtime pay, cut the sugar ration by a third, and curtailed practically all major industrial programs. Only military expenditures were increased, by $140 million to an estimated $1 billion. Nasser also increased the price of beer, cigarettes, long-distance bus and railroad fares and admission to movies. Egypt was losing $5,000,000 a week in revenues from the closing of the Suez Canal, on the other side of which, the Israelis were sitting on the Sinai wells that had produced half of Egypt's oil supply. Egypt's hard-currency debt was now approaching $1.5 billion and its foreign-exchange reserves were down to $100 million.

As part of the Khartoum Resolution of August, Egypt announced that it was ready to end the war in Yemen. Egyptian Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Riad, proposed that Egypt and Saudi Arabia revive their Jeddah Agreement of 1965. Faisal expressed satisfaction with Nasser's offer, and al-Badr promised to send his troops to fight with Egypt against Israel, should Nasser live up to the Jeddah agreement Nasser and Faisal signed a treaty under which Nasser would pull out his 20,000 troops from Yemen, Faisal would stop sending arms to al-Badr, and three neutral Arab states would send in observers. Sallal accused Nasser of betrayal. Nasser unfroze more than $100 million worth of Saudi assets in Egypt, and Faisal denationalized two Egyptian-owned banks that he had taken over earlier that year. Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Kuwait agreed to provide Egypt with an annual subsidy of $266 million, out of which $154 million was to be paid by Saudi Arabia.

Sallal's popularity among his troops declined, and after two bazooka attacks on his home by disaffected soldiers, he took Egyptian guards. He ordered the execution of his security chief, Colonel Abdel Kader Khatari, after Khatari's police fired into a mob attacking an Egyptian command post in San'a, and had refused to recognize the committee of Arab leaders appointed at Khartoum to arrange peace terms. He also fired his entire Cabinet and formed a new one, installing three army men in key ministries, and took over the army ministry and the foreign ministry for himself. Meanwhile, Nasser announced the release of three republican leaders who had been held prisoner in Egypt for more than a year, and who were in favor of peace with the royalists. The three were Qadi Abdul Rahman Iryani, Ahmed Noman and General Amri. When Sallal met with Nasser in Cairo in early November, Nasser advised him to resign and go into exile. Sallal refused and went to Baghdad, hoping to get support from other Arab Socialists. As soon as he left Cairo, Nasser sent a cable to San'a, instructing his troops there not to block an attempt at a coup.

Siege of Sana'a

詳細は「Siege of Sana'a (1967)」を参照

Prince Mohamed bin Hussein, deputy to Muhammad al-Badr, in command of the royalist forces besieging San'a, December 1967

On November 5, Yemeni dissidents, supported by republican tribesmen called down to San'a, moved four tanks into the city's dusty squares, took over the Presidential Palace and announced over the government radio station that Sallal had been removed "from all positions of authority". The coup went unopposed. In Baghdad, Sallal asked for political asylum, saying "every revolutionary must anticipate obstacles and difficult situations". The Iraqi government offered him a home and a monthly grant of 500 dinars.

The new republican government was headed by Qadi Abdul Rahman Iryani, Ahmed Noman and Mohamed Ali Uthman. The Prime Minister was Mohsin al-Aini. Noman, however, remained in Beirut. He was doubtful of his colleagues reluctance to negotiate with the Hamidaddin family, preferring to expel it instead. On November 23, he resigned, and his place was taken by Hassan Amri. Prince Mohamed bin Hussein told the country's chiefs "We have money, and you will have your share if you join us. If not, we will go on without you". The chiefs agreed to mobilize their tribes. 6,000 royalist regulars and 50,000 armed tribesmen known as "the Fighting Rifles" surrounded San'a, captured its main airport and severed the highway to the port of Hodeida, a main route for Russian supplies. In a battle twelve miles east of the capital, 3,200 soldiers of both sides were killed, and an entire republican regiment reportedly deserted to the royalists. Bin Hussein gave them an ultimatum: "Surrender the city or be annihilated". Iryani went to Cairo for what the Egyptian official press agency called "a medical checkup". Foreign Minister Hassan Macky also left Yemen, leaving the government in charge of Amri. Amri declared a 6 p.m. curfew and ordered civilians to form militia units "to defend the republic". In Liberation Square, six suspected royalist infiltrators were publicly executed by a firing squad, and their bodies were later strung up on poles.

The republicans boasted a new air force, while the royalists claimed to have shot down a MiG-17 fighter with a Russian pilot. The US State Department said that this claim, as well as reports of twenty-four MiGs and forty Soviet technicians and pilots who had arrived in Yemen, were correct. In January, the republicans were defending San'a with about 2,000 regulars and tribesmen, plus armed townsmen and about ten tanks. They also had the backing of a score or more fighter aircraft piloted by Russians or Yemenis who passed a crash course in the Soviet Union. The city could still feed itself from the immediately surrounding countryside. Between 4,000 and 5,000 royalists suffered from republican air power, but had the advantage of high ground. However, they did not have enough ammunition, as the Saudis had halted arms deliveries after the Khartoum agreement and stopped financing the royalists after December.

Final accords

By February 1968, the siege was lifted and the republicans had essentially won the war. Meanwhile, the British had withdrawn from the Federation of South Arabia, which had now become South Yemen. The royalists remained active until 1970. Talks between the two sides commenced while the fighting went on. The Foreign Minister, Hassan Makki, said "Better years of talk than a day of fighting". In 1970, Saudi Arabia recognized the Republic, and a ceasefire was effected. The Saudis gave the republic a grant of $20 million, which was later repeated intermittently, and Yemeni sheiks received Saudi stipends. By 1971, both Egypt and Saudi Arabia had disengaged from Yemen. South Yemen formed a connection with the Soviet Union. In September 1971, Amri resigned after murdering a photographer in San'a, and more power was given to Iryani, the effective President. By then, the royalists were integrated into the new republic, except for al-Badr's family, and a consultative Council was established. Clashes along the border between the states rose, and in 1972 a small war broke.

After the war, the tribes were better represented in the republican government. In 1969 sheihks were brought into the National Assembly and in 1971 into the Consultative Council. Under Iryani, the sheiks, particularly the ones who fought for the republicans and were close to the mediation attempt. By the end of the war there was a breach between the older and more liberal politicians and republican sheiks, and certain army sheiks and activists from South Yemen. In the summer of 1972 a border war broke and ended with a declaration from both North Yemen and South Yemen that they would reunite, but they did not. There were complaints in North Yemen about foreign influence by Saudi Arabia.

Opposing forces

Royalists

Yemeni Prime Minister, Prince Hassan, talking to tribesmen outside his cave in Wadi Amlah, December 1962

Muhammad al-Badr led his campaign with the princes of the house of Hamidaddin. Those included Hassan bin Yahya, who had come from New York, Mohamed bin Hussein, Mohamed bin Ismail, Ibrahim al Kipsy, and Abdul Rahman bin Yahya. At fifty-six, Hassan bin Yahya was the oldest and most distinguished. Prince Hassan was made Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief. The Imam was joined by his childhood pen pal, American Bruce Conde, who set up the post office and would later rise to the rank of general in the Royalist forces.

In 1963, the Saudis spent $15 million to equip royalist tribes, hire hundreds of European mercenaries, and establish their own radio station. Pakistan, which saw a chance to make money in the conflict, extended rifles to the royalists. Remnants of the Imam's Army also had elements of the Saudi National Guard fight alongside its ranks. Iran subsidized royalist forces on and off, as the Shah felt compelled to provide al-Badr (a Zaidi) with financing. The British allowed convoys of arms to flow through one of its allies in Northern Yemen, the Sheriff of Beijan, who was protected by the British administration in Aden. British military planes conducted night operations to resupply al-Badr's forces. The MI6 was responsible for contacting the royalists, and used the services of a private company belonging to Colonel David Stirling, founder of the Special Air Service (SAS), who recruited dozens of former SAS men as advisors to the royalists. Britain participated in a $400 million British air defense program for Saudi Arabia. The Lyndon Johnson administration was more willing than Kennedy's to support long-range plans in support of the Saudi army. In 1965, the US authorized an agreement with the Corps of Engineers to supervise the construction of military facilities and in 1966 it sponsored a $100 million program which provided the Saudi forces with combat vehicles, mostly trucks. Faisal also initiated an Islamic alignment called the Islamic Conference, to counter Nasser's Arab socialism.

Prince Abdullah Hussein (below, center) with his men soon after the Egyptian air attack in Wadi Hirran, December 1962

The tribes of Southern Saudi Arabia and Northern Yemen were closely linked, and the Saudis enticed thousands of Yemeni workers in Saudi Arabia to assist the royalist cause. In addition to the Saudis and British, the Iraqis also sent plane loads of Baathist Yemenis to undermine Sallal's regime. The royalists fought for the Imam despite his father's unpopularity. One sheik said "The Imams have ruled us for a thousand years. Some were good and some bad. We killed the bad ones sooner or later, and we prospered under the good ones". The hill tribes were Shia, like the Imam, while the Yemenis of the coast and the south were Sunni, as were most Egyptians. President Sallal was himself a mountain Shia fighting with lowland Sunnis. Al-Badr himself was convinced that he was Nasser's biggest target, saying "Now I'm getting my reward for befriending Nasser. We were brothers, but when I refused to become his stooge, he used Sallal against me. I will never stop fighting. I will never go into exile. Win or lose, my grave will be here".

Al-Badr had formed two royalist armies — one under his uncle Prince Hassan in the east and one under his own control in the west. Both armies controlled most of the north and east of Yemen, including the towns of Harib and Marib. The provincial capital of Northern Yemen, Sadah, which would have given the Imam a key strategic road towards the main capital San'a, was controlled by the republicans. There were also areas like the town of Hajjah, where the royalists controlled the mountains while the Egyptians and republicans controlled the town and fortress. Mercenaries from France, Belgium and England, who had fought in Rhodesia, Malaya, Indochina and Algeria, were sent to assist the Imam in planning, training and giving the irregular forces the ability to communicate with one another and the Saudis. They trained tribesmen in the use of antitank weapons, such as the 106mm gun and in mining techniques. The numbers of mercenaries are estimated in the hundreds, although Egyptian sources at the time reported 15,000. Royalist tactics were confined to guerilla warfare, isolating conventional Egyptian and republican forces, and conducting attacks on supply lines.

British involvement 1962–1965

British mercenaries in the mountains of north Yemen helping royalist rebels set up a heavy machine gun above a hideout cave

Until the end of 1965, the British presence in Aden was considered of high interest to the United Kingdom, linked to the realization of oil assets in the Middle East. The means to secure this presence however involved a bitter argument within the British government, with no coherency in decision making on the Yemen issue. The objective of the British was mainly keeping the Aden base via cooperating with the Federation of South Arabia, which complicated British relations with many global and regional players, as well as with the rulers of South Arabia themselves. The British involvement was executed mainly via the British Mercenary Organization, which was capable to stage its own covert operations, independent of London and away from the view of their sponsor Saudi Arabia.

Three decades after the war, former Mossad director, Shabtai Shavit, and Ariel Sharon both said Israel had been clandestinely involved in Yemen, though both remained vague concerning the nature and scale of the involvement. According to Jones, what is clear however is that some of the mercenary air drops to the royalists (code-named "Mango") were organized by the British using the Israeli Air Force (IAF) aircraft, which were contracted privately to the British mercenary operation and were either using Israeli air bases or Israeli transport planes themselves making the drops.

According to Duff Hart-Davis, the British mercenary leader Jim Johnson had originally considered buying their own aircraft, a Lockheed Constellation 749. He then flew to Teheran to try to persuade the Iranians to do an air drop. Success was finally achieved by an adviser to the mercenaries, the MP Neil "Billy" McLean, who privately (without the British government's knowledge) flew to Tel Aviv to meet Moshe Dayan, defense minister, and Meir Amit, head of Mossad. According to "Haaretz" newspaper, Tony Boyle contacted David Karon, the head of the Middle East department in the Tevel (Cosmos) section of the Mossad, and met with IAF commander Ezer Weizman and his officers. It was decided that the airdrops would be made.

Haaretz suggested the crew of the airdrops were British; while according to Hart-Davis the crew were Israeli (including the pilot named Arieh Oz), with Tony Boyle on board as an observer. The first weapons drop, witnessed on the ground by British mercenary Lieutenant Colonel Johnny Cooper, provided the royalists with a morale-boosting 180 old rifles, 34,000 rounds of Mauser and 17,000 rounds of .303 rifle ammunition, 72 six-pounder antitank shells and 150 pounds of plastic explosive. According to Hart-Davis, the Israelis had systematically concealed the source of the weapons, brazing out all the serial numbers, using Italian parachutes, and even ensuring that the packaging consisted of wood-shavings from Cyprus. The originally Israeli aircraft flew along the Saudi coastline. The Saudis did not have radar systems, and would later claim they were not aware of the airlifts. The planes would make the drops and then refuel in French Somaliland (now Djibouti) and return to bases in Israel.

The airlifts were originally codenamed "Operation Gravy", but were later renamed "Operation Porcupine". The IAF's largest transport plane, a Stratofreighter, was recruited for the British operation. The first flight took off in March 1964 from Tel Nof Airbase. During the sixth flight, Boyle suggested that the IAF aircraft would also be used to bomb San'a. Weizman supported the idea and plans were made, but the Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff (Ramatkal) Yitzhak Rabin and Israeli Prime Minister, Levi Eshkol, denied him. The Porcupine operation went on over a period of slightly more than two years, during which the Stratofreighter carried out 14 nighttime sorties from Tel Nof to Yemen. Mossad operated at least one agent in Yemen, Baruch Mizrahi, who was caught in 1972 and imprisoned in Egypt. He was released in a prisoner exchange between Egypt and Israel following the Yom Kippur War in 1973.

British support to the royalists remained covert throughout. The Prime Minister Alec Douglas-Home replied to Michael Foot's parliamentary question on 14 May 1964, having according to Hart-Davis "to skate across thin ice" by saying "Our policy towards the Yemen is one of non-intervention in the affairs of that country. It is not therefore our policy to supply arms to the Royalists in the Yemen, and the Yemen Government have not requested these or other forms of aid." To a further question (by George Wigg), Douglas-Home said that "at no time in the last eighteen months have British arms been supplied to the Imam's Government". Hart-Davis notes that this "may have been strictly true; but ... a great many weapons of non-British provenance had been spirited into the Yemen through Jim Johnson's machinations."

British mercenary involvement became public knowledge, when five letters addressed to Johnny Cooper were captured by the Egyptians in November 1963. Their content was published by Al-Ahram and then broadcast by Cairo radio on 1 May 1964. Al-Ahram quoted an estimate for British, French and other foreigners of "over 300 officers", "directed from Britain and most probably under the command of British Intelligence". On 5 July 1964 the Sunday Times published the letters, connecting "these Buchanesque freebooters" (Cooper and his team) with Tony Boyle.

However, the British Government was able to continue denying any knowledge of mercenary activity. On 21 July 1964, Douglas-Home replied to a parliamentary question by saying "Both the present High Commissioner and his predecessor have assured us that they were not aware that the person in question (Tony Boyle) was involved in any way". The following day (22 July 1964), Douglas-Home sent a memorandum to the Foreign Secretary Rab Butler, in which he "decreed that the United Kingdom should 'make life intolerable' for Nasser, 'with money and arms', and that this 'should be deniable if possible'." The result was that a secret Joint Action Committee was created to handle British policy on Yemen. The British support continued until 1965, when the Kingdom decided to abandon its Aden Colony.

Saudi and Jordanian support

Saudis and Jordanians provided an active support to the royalists through the first years of war. At some point Saudi border towns and airfields were attacked by Egyptian forces in order to "prevent Saudi supplies and ammunition from reaching Royalist-held areas in the Yemen".

Egyptian deployment

Brigadier Kamal Hassan Ali, Egyptian chief of operations, at his desk in San'a

Anwar Sadat was convinced that a regiment reinforced with aircraft could firmly secure Al-Sallal and his free officer movement, but within three months of sending troops to Yemen, Nasser realized that this would require a larger commitment than anticipated. A little less than 5,000 troops were sent in October 1962. Two months later, Egypt had 15,000 regular troops deployed. By late 1963, the number was increased to 36,000; and in late 1964, the number rose to 50,000 Egyptian troops in Yemen. In late 1965, the Egyptian troop commitment in Yemen was at 55,000 troops, which were broken into 13 infantry regiments of one artillery division, one tank division and several Special Forces as well as paratroop regiments. Ahmed Abu-Zeid, who served as Egypt's ambassador to royalist Yemen from 1957 to 1961, sent numerous reports on Yemen that did not reach Ministry of Defense officials. He warned Egyptian officials in Cairo, including Defense Minister Amer, that the tribes were difficult and had no sense of loyalty or nationhood. He opposed sending Egyptian combat forces and, arguing that only money and equipment be sent to the Yemeni Free Officers, and warned that the Saudis would finance the royalists.

Egyptian field commanders complained of a total lack of topographical maps causing a real problem in the first months of the war. Commanders had difficulty planning military operations effectively or sending back routine and casualty reports without accurate coordinates. Field units were given maps that were only of use for aerial navigation. Chief of Egyptian Intelligence, Salah Nasr, admitted that information on Yemen was nonexistent. Egypt had not had an embassy in Yemen since 1961; therefore when Cairo requested information from the US ambassador to Yemen, all he provided was an economic report on the country.

An Egyptian instructor at the San'a military academy showing a Yemeni how to use a bayonet affixed to a Mosin-Nagant rifle

In 1963 and 1964 the Egyptians had five squadrons of aircraft in Yemen at airfields near San'a and Hodeida. They were using Yak-11 piston-engined fighters, MiG-15 and MiG-17 jet fighters, Ilyushin Il-28 twin-engined bombers, Ilyushin Il-14 twin-engined transports and Mil Mi-4 transport helicopters. They were also flying four-engined Tupolev bombers from bases in Egypt, such as Aswan. All the air crew were Egyptian, except for the Tupolev bombers which were thought to have mixed Egyptian and Russian personnel. The Ilyushin transports flying between Egypt and Hodeida had Russian crews. Throughout the war, the Egyptians relied on airlift. In January 1964, when royalist forces placed San'a under siege, Egyptian Antonov heavy-lift cargo planes airlifted tons of food and kerosene into the region. The Egyptians estimate that hundreds of millions of dollars were spent to equip Egyptian and republican Yemeni forces, and in addition, Moscow refurbished the Al-Rawda Airfield outside San'a. The politburo saw a chance to gain a toehold on the Arabian Peninsula and accepted hundreds of Egyptian officers to be trained as pilots for service in the Yemen War.

Egyptian air and naval forces began bombing and shelling raids in the Saudi southwestern city of Najran and the coastal town of Jizan, which were staging points for royalist forces. In response, the Saudis purchased a British Thunderbird air defense system and developed their airfield in Khamis Mushayt. Riyadh also attempted to convince Washington to respond on its behalf. President Kennedy sent only a wing of jet fighters and bombers to Dhahran Airbase, demonstrating to Nasser the seriousness of American commitment to defending U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia.

Peace attempts: Khamir, Jeddah and Haradh conferences

Khamir

Noman spoke over Radio San'a, offering reconciliation and inviting "all tribes of all persuasions" to meet with him the following week at Khamir, 50 miles north of San'a, to achieve "the one thing which we all prize over anything else: peace for the nation." In order to convince al-Badr to come the conference, Noman announced that he personally would head the republican delegation at Khamir, and that Sallal would stay in San'a. Al-Badr and his ranking chiefs did not attend the conference, but a handful of pro-royalist sheiks were present. The conference named a committee of five tribal and four religious leaders who were charged with seeking out the "beguiled brothers", al-Badr and his friends. Noman's effort, including a private promise to reach a withdrawal of Egyptian troops, was backed by Nasser. Radio Cairo hailed the Khamir conference as the "dawn of a new era." Sallal called the talks "a complete success", while al-Badr stated that "It is essential that the conflict which has devastated our beloved country be brought to an end by peaceful negotiations between the Yemeni people themselves." However, by early June, when Noman said that Egypt's 50,000 troops would have to be replaced by a joint royalist-republican peace force, the Nasserites lost interest in the deal. After Noman flew to Cairo to protest directly to Nasser, Sallal threw seven civilian Cabinet ministers into jail. Noman resigned, saying "It is obvious that Sallal and his cronies are more interested in war than peace". Sallal soon named a new Cabinet to replace Noman's, with 13 military men and two civilians.

Jeddah

King Faisal at Jeddah

By August, the war was costing Nasser $1,000,000 a day, when he arrived in Jedda harbor aboard his presidential yacht Hurriah (Freedom) to negotiate with Faisal. It was Nasser's first visit to Saudi Arabia since 1956. At the request of the Egyptians, due to assassination rumors, the banners and flags normally put up to celebrate a visiting dignitary were omitted, the sidewalks were cleared of people, and the car was a special bulletproof model. On the evening of his arrival, Nasser was welcomed at a banquet and reception for 700 guests. In less than 48 hours they reached full agreement. Once the agreement was signed, Faisal embraced Nasser and kissed him on both cheeks. The agreement provided for

1. The gradual withdrawal of the Egyptian force within a ten-month period and the cessation of all Saudi help to the royalists; and
2. The formation of a Yemen Congress of fifty, representing all factions, which would be charged with forming a transitional regime and establishing procedures for a national plebiscite to determine Yemen's future government.

Haradh

Prince Abdurrahman bin Yahya, youngest brother of the Imam Ahmad, with a veteran of the imamic army, at Uqd

On November 23, the two sides met in Haradh. The first issue was the name of the transition state that was supposed to exist until a plebiscite could be held the following year. The royalists wanted the name "Kingdom of Yemen" but were willing to settle for a neutral title like "State of Yemen". The republicans insisted on having the word "republic" or "republican" in the title. It was agreed to suspend the conference until after the month-long fast of Ramadan, which was about to begin the following week. The conference reached a deadlock when the Egyptians, possibly due to a tactical decision made by Amer, encouraged the republicans to take a headstrong stand.

See also

• Shia insurgency in Yemen
• Muhammad al-Badr
• Bruce Conde
• Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen
• Saudi-Yemeni War
• Aden Emergency
• List of modern conflicts in the Middle East

References

Bibliography

• Dresch, Paul (1994-01-27). Tribes, Government, and History in Yemen. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 480. ISBN 978-0-19-827790-3. OCLC 19623719 
• Dresch, Paul (2000). A History of Modern Yemen. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-79092-5. OCLC 43657092 
• Hart-Davis, Duff (2011). The War That Never Was. Random House. ISBN 978-1-84605-825-7. OCLC 760081166 

--- (paperback edition), London: Arrow Books, 2012. OCLC 772967969. ISBN 978-0-099-55329-8.

• Jones, Clive (2004). Britain and the Yemen Civil War, 1962–1965: Ministers, Mercenaries and Mandarins: Foreign Policy and the Limits of Covert Action. Brighton ; Portland Or.: Sussex Academic Press. ISBN 978-1-903900-23-9. OCLC 54066312 
• Oren, Michael B. (2002). Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 7–13, 39, 40. ISBN 978-0-19-515174-9. OCLC 155856672 
• Pollack, Kenneth M. (2002). Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991. Studies in war, society, and the military. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press. p. 698. ISBN 978-0-8032-3733-9. OCLC 49225708 
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--- Originally published as The wages of war, 1816–1965, 1972.