利用者:祆/sandbox

カタラウヌムの戦い
フン族のガリア侵攻中
カタラウヌムで戦うフン族 アルフォンス・ド・ヌーヴィル (1836–85)
時 451年6月20日 (0451-06-20) 場所 現在のフランス北東部シャンパーニュ＝アルデンヌ地域圏 結果 戦術的引き分け 戦略的引き分け フン族のガリアからの撤退
衝突した勢力
西ローマ帝国 西ゴート族 サリ族 ブルグント族 サクソン人 アルモリカ人 アラン人	フン族 東ゴート族 ルギイ族 スキリイ族 トゥリンギイ族 フランク人 ゲピド族 ブルグント族 ヘルール族
指揮官
アエティウス テオドリック1世 † サンギバン トリスムンド テオドリック2世 メロヴィクス グンディオク	アッティラ ウァラミル ティウディメル ウィディメル アルダリック キルデリク1世 オドアケル アンダグ ラウダリクス †
戦力
50,000-80,000	50,000-80,000
被害者数
不明	不明

ガリアに侵攻したアッティラ軍の想定進軍路、及びフン族とその同盟軍により略奪ないし脅威を受けた都市

カタラウヌムの戦い（シャロンの戦い、マウリカの戦いとも）は、451年に西ローマ帝国の将軍フラウィウス・アエティウスと西ゴート王テオドリック1世の率いる連合軍と、アッティラ王指揮下のフン族およびその従属勢力との間で行われた会戦である。この戦いは西ローマ帝国による大規模な軍事作戦としては最後のものの一つであったが、連合軍の多数を構成していたのはゲルマン人の同盟部族であった。会戦の結果は戦略的には引き分けであり、西ローマ側はフン族がガリアを支配下に収めるのを阻止し、メロヴィクスをフランク人の王位につけた一方、フン族はガリアの多くを略奪し、西ローマと西ゴートの軍事能力に深刻な打撃を与えた。その後フン族の帝国は、454年にネダオ川の戦いで、支配下にあったゲルマン部族の連合軍に敗北し、瓦解した。

背景

450年のローマ帝国(黄)とフン帝国(橙)

西ローマ帝国によるイタリア以外の属州全土に対する支配は弱体化の一途をたどっていたが、ガリアにおける支配は、450年までには多くの地域で回復していた。名目的な帝国領にすぎなかったアルモリカを除けば、領内に居住しているゲルマン諸部族は、それぞれの指導者の下で定住させられ、フォエデラティとしての条約によって拘束されていた。ガリア北部のうちクサンテン以北のライン川とレイエ川に挟まれた部分（ゲルマニア・インフェリオル）は、事実上放棄され、フランク人の支族であるサリ族のものとなっていた。ガロンヌ川流域の西ゴート族は次第に反抗的になりつつあったが、条約には従っていた。これに比べるとサパウディアのブルグント族は従順であったが、彼らもやはり反乱の機会を窺っていた。ロワール川やヴァランティノワのアラン人はさらに忠実であり、411年にヨウィヌスを破り、414年にバザスを陥落させたときからローマに従っていた。ガリアのうち、ローマが未だ確実に支配していた地域は、地中海の沿岸部、アウレリアヌム（現在のオルレアン）を含むセーヌ川及びロワール川の流域でソワソンとアラス以南の地域、ケルン以南のライン川中上流域、ローヌ川の下流域であった。

歴史家のヨルダネスは、アッティラがヴァンダル王ガイセリックに西ゴート族と戦うよう唆され、同時にガイセリックは西ゴート族と西ローマ帝国との間に不和を引き起こそうと企んでいたと述べている(『ゴート史』36.184–6)。しかし、ヨルダネスのゴート史に関する記述は偏向していて信頼できないことで知られており、多くの事柄が無視され、あるいは誤って伝えられている。コナー・ウェイトリーは、カタラウヌムの戦いをヨルダネスの歴史書におけるクライマックスと考えたうえで、この著作の全体が実際にはベリサリウスの遠征とユスティニアヌスの政策に対する政治的な主張であった可能性を指摘している。また、キム・ヒュンジンは、ヨルダネスの記述がマラトンの戦いに対する引喩であり、ヘロドトスの叙述形式に適合するように著しく歪曲されたものではないかとしている。したがって、ヨルダネスによる主張はすべて慎重に精査したうえで理解されるべきであり、さらにその記述の全体が虚構である可能性も存在する。

アッティラの動機について、ヨルダネスとは異なる説明を示した同時代作家も存在する。ウァレンティニアヌス3世の姉、ホノリアは、コンスルを務めたヘルクラヌスと婚約していた。翌450年、彼女は宦官のヒュアキントスをアッティラの元へ送り、幽囚の身から逃れるための助けを求めた。その際、書簡が本物であることを示す証拠として自身の指輪を添えた 。アッティラはこの指輪を彼女の求婚の印として受け止め、結納として帝国の半分を要求した。彼はホノリアが結納とともに送り届けられることを要求したが、ウァレンティニアヌスがこれを拒否したため、アッティラはこれをガリアへの破壊的な遠征を起こすための口実として利用した。この説明についてヒューズは、元になった事実としては、ホノリアがアッティラに与えられたマギステル・ミリトゥムの称号を政治的な手段として利用していたのであろうと述べている。

他にアッティラを動かしたものとして、449年のフランク王クロディオの死が考えられる。アエティウスによってクロディオの次子がライン方面の辺境の守りとして選ばれ、長子はアッティラの宮廷へと逃れた。ボナ、また最近ではキムがこの説をさらに発展させ、このことが実際に戦争の原因、そしてアッティラがガリアを攻撃した最大の理由であると考えている。ボナは、キルデリク1世がアッティラの臣下であったと主張し、彼らメロヴィング朝の創始者たちこそフランク王位を求めて争った二人であるとしている。偽フレデガリウス年代記のやや混乱した記述によれば、キルデリクはフランク族によって追放され、当時フン族に従っていたテューリンゲンに8年間亡命していた。キムは、この記述に登場するウィオマッドという人物が、キルデリクがローマと戦うのを支援し、また彼の帰国に向けて工作したフン族を表していると主張し、カタラウヌムにおけるアッティラの主たる目標は、フランク族を征服し、ライン川周辺に属国を設けることであったと結論づけている。

アッティラは、451年になると、部下と多数の同盟軍を率いてライン川を渡り、4月7日にはディウォドルム（現在のメス）を略奪した。他にどの都市が攻撃を受けたかについては、その都市の司教を讃える聖人伝から明らかにすることができる。ランス司教ニカシウスは、自身の教会の祭壇の前で殺害された。セルウァティウスは、祈りによってトンヘレンを救い、またジュヌヴィエーヴはパリを守ったとされる。トロワ司教ルプスもまた、自らアッティラと対面して都市を救ったと信じられている。ヒューズは、アッティラのガリアに対する広範囲の破壊については二通りの説明が可能であるとしている。第一は、アッティラの主軍がライン川をヴォルムスもしくはマインツで渡った後、トリーア、メス、ランス、オルレアンと進軍し、農村を略奪するため小規模な別働隊を北のフランク領へと派遣したというもの。第二はアッティラが軍を二つか三つに分け、それぞれが別の場所で渡河したというものである。しかし、後者についてヒューズは、いずれかの部隊が脅かされた場合に連携が困難であること、ローマ側の抵抗に関わった未知の人物が多すぎることから、可能性は低いと述べている。

アッティラ軍は5月までにはアウレリアヌム（現在のオルレアン）に到達した。ヨルダネスによれば、アウレリアヌムをフォエデラティの区域として含んでいたアラン人の王サンギバンは、城門を開くことを約束した。アウレリアヌムの攻囲戦は『聖アニアヌス伝』や、その後のトゥールのグレゴリウスの記述からも確認できるが、彼らの記述にはサンギバンの名前は登場しない。アウレリアヌムの住民は迫り来る侵攻軍に対して門を閉ざしたため、アッティラは都市の攻囲を開始し、サンギバンが約束を果たすのを待った。アウレリアヌムの攻囲戦については二つの異なる記述が存在するが、ヒューズは両者を組み合わせることで、事実のよりよい理解が得られるのではないかと述べている。4日間の大雨の後、6月14日にアッティラは最後の突撃を開始したが、ローマ側の連合軍が接近したために頓挫した。ヒューズとキムはともに、アウレリアヌム攻囲戦がアッティラの西ローマ帝国への攻撃のピークであり、アラン人による頑強な守備が451年の戦争における真に決定的な要素であったという点で一致している。また、キムとバクラックは、アラン人はローマによるガリア防衛の忠実な主力であり、決して寝返ろうとはしていなかったと主張している。

戦闘

戦闘の経過

アッティラの侵攻を知った軍総司令官のアエティウスは、イタリアからガリアへと軍を素早く動かした。シドニウス・アポリナリスによると、彼が率いていたのは正規兵を全く含まず、ごく少数のアウクシリアからなる部隊だった。ヒューズは、ここでのローマ軍が少数だったのは、アエティウスの軍の多くがガリアに駐屯していた事実によるものだと主張している。アエティウスはすぐに西ゴート王テオドリック1世を、彼に合流するよう説得しようと試みた。テオドリックはアエティウスの率いる兵が少数であることを知ると、自分たちの土地でフン族を迎撃するために待機することが賢明であると判断した。そのため、アエティウスはガリアの前道長官であったアウィトゥスに助力を求めた。アウィトゥスは、おそらくテオドリックのみならず、ガリアの帰趨のはっきりしない蛮族住民の一部を、ローマ軍に合流するよう説得することができた。ヒューズによると、連合軍はおそらくアルルで集結し、その後西ゴート族と合流するためにトゥールーズへ向かった。軍の補給は、その数年前からフン族の攻撃に備えていたガリア道長官のトナンティウス・フェッレオルスが行った。連合軍はアウレリアヌム（オルレアン）へ進軍し、6月14日に到着した。

アエティウスとその連合軍はアッティラの後を追い始めた。キムによればこのときアッティラは、目的の大部分を達成してガリアを去ろうとしていた。ヨルダネスによれば、会戦の前夜にローマ側のフランク人の一部がアッティラ側のゲピド族の部隊と遭遇し、交戦したが、ヨルダネスの記録する1万5千人という両軍の死者数は実証性に欠ける。マクドウォールはこれを、アッティラが撤退の途上で遅滞戦術をとり、戦場として適当な場所に到着する前にアエティウスに追いつかれることを防ごうとしたものではないかとしている。両軍はついにカタラウヌム平原で会敵した。ビュアリはこの日付を6月20日前後とし、以来これが広く受け入れられているが、9月20日と主張する史料もある。

ヨルダネスによると、戦いの当日の朝にアッティラは、占い師たちに犠牲獣の臓物を調べさせた。すると彼らは、フン族には災いが下るが、敵将もそのうち一人が殺されると予言した。アッティラは第9時（午後2時半ごろ）まで戦いを遅らせ、敗北した場合には日没を撤退に役立てようとした。ヒューズはこれを独自に解釈し、占いはアッティラの野蛮さに対する強調であり、作り話である可能性があると指摘した。また、第9時に戦いを始めた判断についてヒューズは、両陣営が連合軍を入念に配置するのに日中をすべて費やしたことによるものであると述べている。

ヨルダネスによると、カタラウヌムの平原には片側の尾根に向けて急な傾斜があった。この地理的な特徴が戦場の主となり、戦闘の中心となった。まずフン族が尾根の右手を、ローマ人が左手を抑えたが、尾根そのものはどちらにも占拠されていなかった。ヨルダネスは、西ゴート族が右翼に、ローマ軍が左翼に陣取り、帰趨の明らかでないSangiban率いるアラン人を囲んでいたと述べている。フン軍は尾根を奪おうと試みたが、アエティウスのローマ軍とトリスムンドのゴート軍に先を越された。

According to Jordanes, the Catalaunian plain rose on one side by a sharp slope to a ridge; this geographical feature dominated the battlefield and became the center of the battle. The Huns first seized the right side of the ridge, while the Romans seized the left, with the crest unoccupied between them. Jordanes explains that the Visigoths held the right side, the Romans the left, with Sangiban of uncertain loyalty and his Alans surrounded in the middle. The Hunnic forces attempted to take the ridge, but were outstripped by the Romans under Aetius and the Goths under Thorismund.

ヨルダネスはさらに、テオドリックが自身の兵を率いて敵に向かった際、部下に気づかれないまま戦死したとしている。さらに彼はテオドリックが落馬して部下に踏み殺されたか、ゴート族のアンダグの槍にかかって殺害されたとする。ヨルダネスはアンダグの息子グンティギスに書記として仕えていたため、仮に後者の記述が正しくなかった場合でも、これは明らかにその一族を顕彰するための伝承である。

Jordanes goes on to state that Theodoric, whilst leading his own men against the enemy Goths, was killed in the assault without his men noticing. He then states that Theodoric was either thrown from his horse and trampled to death by his advancing men, or slain by the spear of the Goth Andag. Since Jordanes served as the notary of Andag's son Gunthigis, even if this latter story is not true, this version was certainly a proud family tradition.

そしてヨルダネスは西ゴート族がアラン人の速度をしのぎ、アッティラの アッティラは、荷車で守りを固めた自身の陣営に逃れることを強いられた。ローマ・ゴート連合軍の突撃は明らかにフン族の陣営を越え、追撃へと移行した。夜になると、テオドリック王の息子トリスムンドが、味方の隊列に戻ろうとしたところ、誤ってアッティラの野営地に踏み込んだ。彼はそこでの白兵戦で負傷し、部下により救出された。アエティウスもまた暗闇によって部下からはぐれた。部下たちに災いが降り掛かったのではないかと恐れた彼は、残りの夜を同盟軍のゴート族とともに過ごした。

Then Jordanes claims the Visigoths outstripped the speed of the Alans beside them and fell upon Attila's own Hunnic household unit. Attila was forced to seek refuge in his own camp, which he had fortified with wagons. The Romano-Gothic charge apparently swept past the Hunnic camp in pursuit; when night fell, Thorismund, son of king Theodoric, returning to friendly lines, mistakenly entered Attila's encampment. There he was wounded in the ensuing melee before his followers could rescue him. Darkness also separated Aetius from his own men. As he feared that disaster had befallen them, he spent the rest of the night with his Gothic allies.

On the following day, finding the battlefield was "piled high with bodies and the Huns did not venture forth", the Goths and Romans met to decide their next move. Knowing that Attila was low on provisions and "was hindered from approaching by a shower of arrows placed within the confines of the Roman camp", they started to besiege his camp. In this desperate situation, Attila remained unbowed and "heaped up a funeral pyre of horse saddles, so that if the enemy should attack him, he was determined to cast himself into the flames, that none might have the joy of wounding him and that the lord of so many races might not fall into the hands of his foes".

While Attila was besieged in his camp, the Visigoths searched for their missing king and his son Thorismund. After a long search, they found Theodoric's corpse "where the dead lay thickest" and bore him away with heroic songs in sight of the enemy. Upon learning of his father's death, Thorismund wanted to assault Attila's camp, but Aetius dissuaded him. According to Jordanes, Aetius feared that if the Huns were completely destroyed, the Visigoths would break off their allegiance to the Roman Empire and become an even graver threat. So Aetius convinced Thorismund to quickly return home and secure the throne for himself, before his brothers could. Otherwise, civil war would ensue among the Visigoths. Thorismund quickly returned to Tolosa (present-day Toulouse) and became king without any resistance. Gregory of Tours claims Aetius used the same reasoning to dismiss his Frankish allies, and collected the booty of the battlefield for himself.

Outcome of the Battle

The primary sources give little information as to the outcome of the battle, barring Jordanes. All emphasize the casualty count of the battle, and the battle becomes progressively biased into being a viewed as a Gothic victory beginning with Cassiodorus in the early 6th century.

Hydatius states:

"The Huns broke the peace and plundered the Gallic provinces. A great many cities were taken. On the Catalaunian Plains, not far from the city of Metz, which they had taken, the Huns were cut down in battle with the aid of God and defeated by general Aetius and King Theoderic, who had made a peace treaty with each other. The darkness of night interrupted the fighting. King Theoderic was laid low there and died. Almost 300,000 men are said to have fallen in that battle." - Hydatius, Chronicon, 150.

Prosper, contemporary to the battle, states:

"After killing his brother, Attila was strengthened by the resources of the deceased and forced many thousands of neighboring peoples into a war. This war, he announced as a guardian of Roman friendship, he would wage only against the Goths. But when he had crossed the Rhine and many Gallic cities had experienced his savage attacks, both our people and the Goths soon agreed to oppose with allied forces the fury of their proud enemies. And Aetius had such great foresight that, when fighting men were hurriedly collected from everywhere, a not unequal force met the opposing multitude. Although the slaughter of all those who died there was incalculable - for neither side gave way - it appears that the Huns were defeated in this battle because those among them that survived lost their taste for fighting and turned back home." - Prosper, Epitoma Chronicon, s.a. 451.

"The battle raged five miles down from Troyes on the field called Maurica in Campania." - Additamenta ad Chronicon Prosperi Hauniensis, s.a. 451.

"At this time Attila king of the Huns invaded the Gauls. Here trusting in lord Peter the apostle himself patrician Aetius proceeded against him, he would fight with the help of God." - Continuatio Codex Ovetensis.

"Battle was made in the Gauls between Aetius and Attila king of the Huns with both peoples and massacre. Attila fled into the greater Gauls." - Continuatio Codex Reichenaviensis.

The Gallic Chronicles of 452 and 511 state:

"Attila entered Gaul as if he had the right to ask for a wife that was owed to him. There, he inflicted and suffered defeat and then withdrew to his homeland." - Chronica Gallica Anno 452, s.a. 451.

"Patrician Aetius with king Theodoric of the Goths fight against Attila king of the Huns at Tricasses on the Mauriac plain, where Theodoric was slain, by whom it is uncertain, and Laudaricus the relative of Attila: and the bodies were countless. - Chronica Gallica Anno 511, s.a. 451.

The Paschale Chronicle, preserving a garbled and abbreviated passage of Priscus, states:

"While Theodosius and Valentinian, the Augusti, were emperors, Attila, from the race of the Gepid Huns, marched against Rome and Constantinople with a multitude of many tens of thousands. He notified Valentinian, the emperor of Rome, through a Gothic ambassador, "Attila, my master and yours, orders you through me to make ready the palace for him." He gave the same notice to Theodosius, the emperor in Constantinople, through a Gothic ambassador. Aetius, the first man of senatorial rank in Rome, heard the excessive daring of Attila's desparate response and went off to Alaric in Gaul, who was an enemy of Rome because of Honorius. He urged him to join him in standing against Attila, since he had destroyed many Roman cities. They unexpectedly launched himself against him as he was biouvacked near the Danubios river, and cut down his many thousands. Alaric, wounded by a saggita in the engagement, died.

Attila died similarly, carried off by a nasal hemmorhage while he slept at night with his Hunnic concubine. It was suspected that this girl killed him. The very wise Priscus the Thracian wrote about this war." - Chronicon Paschale, p. 587.

It is ultimately Jordanes' writing, whose passages were mentioned above, that leads to the difference in opinions in modern interpretations of the battle's outcome.

As a Roman victory

In the traditional account, modern scholars take a very direct interpretation of Jordanes, although usually with various points of contention. Modern scholars tend to agree that the battle took place on a long ridge, not a plain with a hill to one side. Hughes argues that the Huns deploy in the center, with their vassals on the wings, because they were expecting a Roman infantry center, with cavalry wings. This way Attila could pin down the center with the disorganized Hunnic style of warfare, while the majority of his troops focused on breaking one or both of the enemy flanks. However, Hughes argues that the Romans were expecting this, which is why he placed the Alans in the center of the formation, who were skilled cavalrymen and had advanced knowledge of how to fight alongside the Roman style of warfare. Bachrach also notes that Jordanes' point of placing the Alans in the center due to disloyalty is biased on Jordanes' part.

Jordanes' description of the battle, according to Hughes, takes place from the Roman perspective. Attila's forces arrived on the ridge first, on the far right side, before the Visigoths could take that position. Then Aetius' Romans arrived on the left side of the ridge, and repulsed the Gepids as they came up. Finally the Alans and the Visigoths under Thorismund fought their way up and secured the center of the ridge, holding it against Attila. However, Hughes differs in that he places Thorismund between the Alans and Visigothic main body, rather than on the Visigothic flank. MacDowall, for example, places Thorismund on the far right of the battlefield and states Thorismund's engagement was a skirmish just prior to the main clash. The final phase of the battle is characterized by the Gothic attempt to take the right side of the ridge, in which Theodoric is slain, the rest of his army unaware of his death. It is at this point that Thorismund located Attila's position in the Hunnic battle line, and attacked the Hunnic center, nearly slaying Attila himself and forcing the Hunnic center to retreat. Both armies fell into confusion as darkness descended, and neither side knew the outcome of the battle until the following morning.

After the battle, the allies decided what to do next, and resolved to place Attila under siege for a few days while they discussed the matter. Aetius allegedly persuaded both Thorismund and the Goths, and the Franks as well, to leave the battle and return home. Hughes argues that since the Franks were fighting a civil war in the Battle, and Thorismund had five brothers who could usurp his new-found position as king, that it is likely Aetius did advise them to do so. O'Flynn argues that Aetius persuaded the Visigoths to return home in order to eliminate a group of volatile allies, and argues that he let Attila escape because he would have been just as happy to make an alliance with the Huns as with the Visigoths. The majority of historians also share the view that at this point Attila's "aura of invincibility" was broken, and that Aetius allowed the Huns to retreat in the hopes he could return to a status of partnership with them and draw on the Huns for future military support. The battle, almost immediately afterwards, then became famous for its staggering death toll.

As a Roman defeat

Kim, in his recent work on the Huns, takes a radically different view of the battle's outcome. Kim suggests that, in fact, the entire battle is a play on the Battle of Marathon, with the Romans being the Plateans on the left, the Alans the weak Athenian center, and the Goths the Athenian regulars on the right, with Theodoric as Miltiades and Thorismund as Callimachus. The return home by the Goths to secure Thorismund's throne is the same as the return to Athens to protect it from sedition and the Persian Navy.

Kim also suggests a radically different outcome of the battle: his argument is mostly based on the description of the positions of various forces after the battle, which he believes to be the part that is actually factual. Thorismund and Aetius both lose track of their armies, both in the middle of the enemy army in the confusion of the night, with Aetius fearing that disaster had happened. He argues the important piece of information given is that the Huns were unable to near the Roman camp because of the archers positioned within it, stating that what really happened is that the Roman coalition had routed and the Huns had chased them back to their camps, not Attila being chased to his.

Kim uses this to build a new interpretation: after Theodoric is killed, the Gothic line routs and leaves a gap in the line for the Huns to exploit, making the Visigoths at fault for the disaster. He says that Jordanes tries to place the fault on the Alans, who bore the brunt of the battle in the center because they were the most reliable of the allied forces and a hindrance to Visigothic hegemony in the region at the time.

However, Kim's views have received a mixed reception among scholars of the period, with one reviewer noting that much of the text amounts to "a confused and confusing story, involving the rewriting of histories, genealogies and chronologies... exacerbated by strange and clumsy conflations." They therefore should be taken with skepticism.

Forces

Both armies consisted of combatants from many peoples. Besides the Roman troops, Jordanes lists Aetius' allies as including (besides the Visigoths) the Francii, Riparii, Sauromationes, Aremoriciani, Liticiani, Burgundians, Saxones, and Olibrones (whom he describes as "once Roman soldiers and now the flower of the allied forces"), and "other Celtic or German tribes." Fleuriot argues that the British Litaui also joined Aetius in the battle, being called Liticiani by Jordanes and Britones by Gregory of Tours. Halsall argues that the Rhine Limitanei and the old British field army composed that of the Armoricans, and Heather suggests that the Visigoths may have been able to field about 25,000 men total. Drinkwater adds that a faction of Alamanni may have participated in the battle, possibly on both sides like the Franks and Burgundians.

Jordanes' list for Attila's allies includes the Gepids under their king Ardaric, as well as an army of various Gothic groups led by the brothers Valamir, Theodemir (the father of the later Ostrogothic king Theodoric the Great) and Widimer, scions of the Amali Goths. Sidonius offers a more extensive list of allies: Rugians, Gepids, Geloni, Burgundians, Sciri, Bellonoti, Neuri, Bastarnae, Thuringians, Bructeri, and Franks living along the Neckar River E.A. Thompson expresses his suspicions that some of these names are drawn from literary traditions rather than from the event itself:

The Bastarnae, Bructeri, Geloni and Neuri had disappeared hundreds of years before the time of the Huns, while the Bellonoti had never existed at all: presumably the learned poet was thinking of the Balloniti, a people invented by Valerius Flaccus nearly four centuries earlier.

On the other hand, Thompson believes that the presence of Burgundians on the Hunnic side is credible, noting that a group is documented as remaining east of the Rhine; likewise, he believes that the other peoples Sidonius alone mentions (the Rugians, Scirans and Thuringian) were likely participants in this battle.

However, the number of participants for either side is entirely speculative. Jordanes reports the number of dead from this battle as 165,000, excluding the casualties of the Franco-Gepid skirmish previous to the main battle. Hydatius, a historian who lived at the time of Attila's invasion, reports the number of 300,000 dead. However, the Chronicon Paschale, which preserves an extremely abbreviated and garbled fragment of Priscus' account of the campaign, states Attila's forces numbered in the tens of thousands.

The figures of both Jordanes and Hydatius are implausibly high. Thompson remarks in a footnote, "I doubt that Attila could have fed an army of even 30,000 men." However Lindner argues that by crossing the Carpathians the Huns had forfeitted their best logistic base and grazing grounds, and that the Hungarian plain could only support 15,000 mounted nomads. Kim notes that the Huns continued use of the Xiongnu decimal system, meaning their army was probably organized into divisions of 10, 100, 1000, and 10,000, but no real estimates of Hunnic military capacity can be determined. Their barbarian allies, however, do receive mentions at other times in other sources: in 430 A.D. Octar was defeated by a force of 3000 Neckar Burgundians, and Heather estimates that both the Gepids and the Amali Goths could have fielded 15,000 men each at the Battle of Nedao in 454. Therefore, the total Hunnic forces could have plausibly been in excess of 48,000 men.

A sense of the size of the actual Roman army may be found in the study of the Notitia Dignitatum by A.H.M. Jones. This document is a list of officials and military units that was last updated in the first decades of the 5th century. Notitia Dignitatum lists 58 various regular units, and 33 limitanei serving either in the Gallic provinces or on the frontiers nearby; the total of these units, based on Jones analysis, is 34,000 for the regular units and 11,500 for the limitanei, or just under 46,000 all told. However, this figure is an estimate for the years 395-425 A.D. and one that constantly changes with new research. The loss of Africa, which cut approximately 40,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry or more from the Roman army on top of previous losses, was enough to permanently cripple the Roman military capacity. Therefore, the figure of the Gallic field army cannot be used for the Battle of the Catalaunian Fields, but it does indicate the Roman forces provided to the battle were significantly lower than the estimated 34,000 men.

The combined forces of the federates would have been far greater in number, while the Roman forces in Gaul had become much smaller by this time. Assuming that the Hunnic forces were roughly the same size as the Roman and federate army, the number involved in battle could be in excess of 100,000 combatants in total. This excludes the inevitable servants and camp followers who usually escape mention in primary sources.

Site of the Catalaunian Fields

en:Template:details The actual location of the Catalaunian Fields is unclear: Historian Thomas Hodgkin located the site near Méry-sur-Seine, but current consensus is that there is no conclusive site, merely being that it is in the vicinity of Châlons-en-Champagne (formerly called Châlons-sur-Marne) or Troyes. More recent evaluations of the Battlefield have been performed, notably by Phillippe Richardot, who proposed a location of La Cheppe, slightly north of the modern town of Chalons.

Simon Macdowall in his 2015 Osprey title proposed the battle took place at Montgueux just west of Troyes. Macdowall goes as far as to identify the Roman alliance's camp site being placed at Fontvannes, a few kilometers west of the proposed battlefield, and places Attila's camp on the Seine at Saint-Lyé. This draws on the earlier work of M. Girard, who was able to identify Maurica as the "les Maures" ridge of Montgueux, based on the second Additamenta Altera to Prosper's Epitoma Chronicon, which states it took place five Roman miles from Tecis a.k.a. Tricasses, being modern Troyes. The road in the region is known as the "Voie des Maures", and the base of the ridge is known as "l'enfer" to the locals. A small stream near the battlefield that runs to Troyes is known as "la Riviere de Corps" to this day. According to MacDowall, modern maps continue to identify the plains in the region as the "les Maurattes." The ridge at Montgueux is currently the best researched proposal for the battlefield location.

In 1842, a labourer uncovered a burial at Pouan-les-Vallées, a village on the south bank of the Aube River, that consisted of a skeleton with a number of jewels and gold ornaments and buried with two swords. By the nature of its grave goods, it was initially thought to be the burial of Theodoric, but Hodgkin expressed skepticism, suggesting that this elite burial was that of a princely Germanic warrior who had lived in the 5th century. The Treasure of Pouan is conserved in the Musée Saint-Loup (Musée d'Art d'Archéologie et de Sciences Naturelles), Troyes. It is still unknown whether or not the find is related to the battle.

Historical importance

Traditional view: The battle was of macro-historical importance

This battle, especially since Edward Gibbon addressed it in The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire and Sir Edward Creasy wrote his The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World, has been considered by many historians to be one of the most important battles of Late Antiquity, at least in the Latin-speaking world.

Creasy quoted Herbert's Attila concerning this battle

The discomfiture of the mighty attempt of Attila to found a new anti-Christian dynasty upon the wreck of the temporal power of Rome, at the end of the term of twelve hundred years, to which its duration had been limited by the forebodings of the heathen.

Creasy also stated:

Attila's attacks on the Western empire were soon renewed, but never with such peril to the civilized world as had menaced it before his defeat at Châlons; and on his death, two years after that battle, the vast empire which his genius had founded was soon dissevered by the successful revolts of the subject nations. The name of the Huns ceased for some centuries to inspire terror in Western Europe, and their ascendancy passed away with the life of the great king by whom it had been so fearfully augmented.

John Julius Norwich, the historian known for his works on Venice and on Byzantium, said of the battle of Chalons:

It should never be forgotten that in the summer of 451 and again in 452, the whole fate of western civilization hung in the balance. Had the Hunnish army not been halted in these two successive campaigns, had its leader toppled Valentinian from his throne and set up his own capital at Ravenna or Rome, there is little doubt that both Gaul and Italy would have been reduced to spiritual and cultural deserts.

He goes on to say that though the battle in 451 was "indecisive insofar as both sides sustained immense losses and neither was left master of the field, it had the effect of halting the Huns' advance."

There are a couple of reasons why this combat has kept its epic importance down the centuries. One is that —ignoring the Battle of Qarqar (Karkar), which was forgotten at this time— this was the first significant conflict that involved large alliances on both sides. No single nation dominated either side; rather, two alliances met and fought in surprising coordination for the time. Arthur Ferrill, addressing this issue, goes on to say:

After he secured the Rhine, Attila moved into central Gaul and put Orleans under siege. Had he gained his objective, he would have been in a strong position to subdue the Visigoths in Aquitaine, but Aetius had put together a formidable coalition against the Hun. Working frenetically, the Roman leader had built a powerful alliance of Visigoths, Alans and Burgundians, uniting them with their traditional enemy, the Romans, for the defense of Gaul. Even though all parties to the protection of the Western Roman Empire had a common hatred of the Huns, it was still a remarkable achievement on Aetius' part to have drawn them into an effective military relationship.

Addressing Attila's fearsome reputation, and the importance of this battle, Gibbon noted that it was from his enemies we hear of his terrible deeds, not from friendly chroniclers, emphasizing that the former had no reason to elevate Attila's reign of terror, and the importance of the Battle of Chalons in proving Attila to be defeatable.

Opposing view: The battle was not of macro-historical importance

However, J.B. Bury expresses a quite different judgement:

The battle of Maurica was a battle of nations, but its significance has been enormously exaggerated in conventional history. It cannot in any reasonable sense be designated as one of the critical battles of the world. The Gallic campaign had really been decided by the strategic success of the allies in cutting off Attila from Orleans. The battle was fought when he was in full retreat, and its value lay in damaging his prestige as an invincible conqueror, in weakening his forces, and in hindering him from extending the range of his ravages.

The number of combatants, while not as small as many conflicts over the following centuries, is not large compared to the entire forces of the Roman empire. And it did not halt Attila's campaign against the Roman Empire: the following year a weakened Attila invaded Italy, and caused much destruction, only ending his campaign after Pope Leo I met with him at a ford of the river Mincio. It was only after Attila's sudden death in 453, and after the divided and competing Hunnic forces fell upon each other at the Battle of Nedao in the following year, that the Huns vanished as a threat to Europe.

Further, following this victory the Roman Empire did not emerge with renewed military might, but instead was likewise weakened, though more slowly than the Huns: despite the assassinations of first Aetius, then Emperor Valentinian III, then the Sack of Rome by Geiseric in 455, a generation later there were still sufficient useful remains of the Western Roman Empire for the warlords to fight over. As Bury further observes:

If Attila had been victorious, if he had defeated the Romans and the Goths at Orleans, if he had held Gaul at his mercy and had translated — and we have no evidence that this was his design — the seat of his government and the abode of his people from the Theiss to the Seine or the Loire, there is no reason to suppose that the course of history would have been seriously altered. For the rule of the Huns in Gaul could only have been a matter of a year or two; it could not have survived here, any more than it survived in Hungary, the death of the great king, on whose brains and personal character it depended. Without depreciating the achievement of Aetius and Theoderic we must recognise that at worst the danger they averted was of a totally different order from the issues which were at stake on the fields of Plataea and the Metaurus. If Attila had succeeded in his campaign, he would probably have been able to compel the surrender of Honoria, and if a son had been born of their marriage and proclaimed Augustus in Gaul, the Hun might have been able to exercise considerable influence on the fortunes of that country; but that influence would probably not have been anti-Roman.

It is highly notable that Bury, who does not believe the Battle of Chalons to be of macrohistorical importance, characterizes Aetius' rule thus: "From the end of the regency to his own death, Aetius was master of the Empire in the west, and it must be imputed to his policy and arms that Imperial rule did not break down in all the provinces by the middle of the fifth century." Bury goes on to say, after noting that the emperor had cut off his right hand with his left by murdering the only man who held the dying empire together, "Who was now to save Italy from the Vandals?" Bury made clear that there was no one capable of taking Aetius' place.

Several other respected historians have similar views.

Aftermath and reputation of the battle

Gibbon succinctly states:

Attila's retreat across the Rhine confessed the last victory which was achieved in the name of the Western Roman Empire.

The following year, Attila renewed his claims to Honoria and territory in the Western Roman Empire. Leading his troops across the Alps and into Northern Italy, he conquered the cities of Aquileia, Vicetia, Verona, Brixia, Bergomum and Milan. Finally, at the very gates of Rome, he turned his army back only after negotiating with the pope.

Another reason the ferocity of this campaign left a deep impression upon its contemporaries is that not only did Attila savage much of Europe in a manner unrepeated for centuries, but the battle acquired a reputation for carnage almost immediately. Considering the extravagant totals for casualties, Gibbon remarked that they "suppose a real and effective loss, sufficient to justify the historian's remark that whole generations may be swept away by the madness of kings in a single hour".

Primary sources immediately note the battle for being exceptionally bloody. Prosper Tiro of Aquitaine states that the battle was a mass slaughter, writing immediately afterwards. The Gallic Chronicle of 452, Jordanes, Hydatius, and the Lex Gundobada all state or indicate the casualties were extreme. Jordanes explicitly states:

For, if we may believe our elders, a brook flowing between low banks through the plain was greatly increased by blood of the slain. It was not flooded by showers, as brooks usually rise, but was swollen by a strange stream and turned into a torrent by the increase of blood. Those whose wounds drove them to slake their parching thirst drank water mingled in gore. In their wretched plight they were forced to drink what they thought was the blood they had poured from their own wounds.

The philosopher Damascius stated that the fighting was so severe "that no one survived except only the leaders on either side and a few followers: but the ghosts of those who fell continued the struggle for three whole days and nights as violently as if they had been alive; the clash of their arms was clearly audible". The Gallic Chronicle of 511 remarks that one participant stated "cadavera vero innumera" or "truly innumerable corpses." The works of Sidonius Apollinaris, Jordanes, Gregory of Tours, and the Chronicle of Fredegar all claimed that it was in the authors' beliefs a mistake to let Attila and his army escape. Tackholm makes note of the evolution of the view of the battle, which goes from being a stalemate in the 5th century, to being hailed as a great victory for the Goths in the 6th as they distorted it to fit their own ethnography.

A further reason for the reputation of this battle is that it was the first major battle since the death of Constantine I where a predominantly Christian force faced a predominantly pagan opponent. This factor was very much apparent to the contemporaries, who often mention prayer playing a factor in this battle (e.g., Gregory of Tours' story of the prayers of Aetius' wife saving the Roman's life in Historia Francorum 2.7).

関連項目

• Battle of Nedao
• Flavius Aetius
• Huns
• Late Roman army
• Attila
• Visigoths

関連文献

• J.F.C. Fuller. "The Battle of Chalons", "A Military History of the Western World: From the Earliest Times to the Battle of Lepanto", Da Capo Press, New York, vol. 1. pp. 282–301. ISBN 0-306-80304-6.
• Man, John. "Attila: The Barbarian King Who Challenged Rome." New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2006.
• Kim, Hyun Jin. "The Huns, Rome, and the Birth of Europe." Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
• Hughes, Ian. "Aetius: Attila's Nemesis." Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Books Ltd., 2012.
• Tackholm, Ulf. "Aetius and the Battle on the Catalaunian Fields." Opuscula Romana VII:15. 1969. 259-276.
• MacDowall, Simon. "Catalaunian Fields AD 451, Rome's Last Great Battle." Oxford: Osprey Publishing Ltd. 2015.
• Ferril, Arther. "The Fall of the Roman Empire: The Military Explanation." Thames & Hudson, 1988.
• Bury, John Bagnall. "History of the Later Roman Empire." Macmillan & Co. Ltd. 1923.

外部リンク

• History of the Later Roman Empire (1923) at LacusCurtius.
• Italy and Her Invaders (1918) at LacusCurtius.
• The Origin and Deeds of the Goths by Jordanes. Translated by Charles C. Mierow.